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Nowadays, physical layer security has attracted significant attention since it
can prevent eavesdropping without the help of the upper layer data encryption. The
essence is to utilize the channel state information (CSI) of the channels to limit the
information rate that can be attained by the unauthorized users (eavesdroppers).
In this work, the physical layer security in one way relay system (OWRS) and two-
way relay system (TWRS) is studied. In the OWRS, we first minimize the power
of relays under information rate constraints. A novel approach is proposed to grant
the optimal solution of the non-convex QCQP problem which is much simpler than
the semidefinite programming (SDP) approach in terms of complexity. Then it is
proved that as the maximum value of the source power increases, the total power
xi
of the relays will decrease. Second, we solve the problem of the secrecy rate max-
imization by looking for the optimal weight vector of the relays. It is shown that
the optimization problem of the beamforming vector is a product of two Rayleigh
quotients (RQ) which in general has been considered as a difficult problem. We
convert the non-convex problem to a convex problem with one dimension search.
Then we significantly simplify the problem using the generalized eigenvalues. In
TWRS, in the case of the CSI of the eavesdropper is available, we consider the
problem of maximizing the secrecy sum rate under total power constraint. Even
though null space beamforming reduced the problem to a product of two RQs, the
problem remained hard to solve and suboptimal solutions have been proposed to
solve it. Here, two approaches are proposed to maximize the secrecy sum rate: 1)
the optimal null space beamforming approach, 2) suboptimal approach (Ignoring
one Rayleigh quotient (IORQ)) that outperforms the null space beamforming es-
pecially when the number of relays is small. When the CSI of the eavesdropper is
unknown, artificial noise is used to impair the signal to noise ratio (SNR) at the
eavesdropper. The problem is formulated to reserve the maximum possible power
for the artificial noise and a required quality of service (QoS) at the legitimate
transceivers are achieved. The problem is formulated as QCQP, and hence the
proposed approach adopted in OWRS is upgraded to solve the problem. Our pro-
posed solution can be used for all QCQPs with positive definite objective function
and two trace constraints. Simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of our
algorithms in terms of optimality and low complexity.
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 ملخص الرسالة
 
 
 مهند علي عبدالوحد عبيد :الاسم الكامل
 
الأمان باستخدام الطبقة الفيزيائية في أنظمة المرحلات ذات الاتجاه الواحد والمرحلات ذات  :عنوان الرسالة
 الاتجاهين
 
 اتصالاتهندسة  التخصص:
 
 ماجستير :تاريخ الدرجة العلمية
 
هذه الأيام نلاحظ ان موضوع تحقيق الأمان باستخدام الطبقة الفيزيائية يحوز اهتمام كثير من الباحثين 
والمهندسين حيث انه يستطيع ان يمنع التنصت على المعلومات بدون استخدام تشفير الطبقات العليا. خلاصة 
ية المعلومات التي ممكن ان يستقبلها أمان الطبقة الفيزيائية هو استخدام معلومات حالة القنوات للحد من كم
) ذات الاتجاه الواحد وأيضا syaleRالمتنصت.  في هذه الرسالة درسنا أمان الطبقة الفيزيائية في المرحلات (
في المرحلات التي ترسل في اتجاهين.  بالنسبة للأمان في المرحلات ذات الاتجاه الواحد قمنا أولا بتصغير قيمة 
لمرحلات عندما يكون هناك قيود للأمان للمستقبل الشرعي و المتصنت. استطعنا ان نوجد الطاقة المطلوبة  ل
) حيث ان حلنا أبسط بكثير من الحل باستخدام rotcev gnimrofmaebالحل الأمثل لمتجه التوجيه (
ا . ثم اثبتنا انه كلما زادت طاقة المرسل قلت طاقة المرحلات. ثاني)PDS( gnimmargorp tinifidimes
) عندما تكون الطاقة الكاملة محدودة. أوضحنا ان المشكلة هي etar ycercesقمنا بتعظيم قيمة معدل الأمان (
) ثم حولناها إلى مسألة قابلة للحل مع بحث عن قيمة معينة ذات بعد واحد. ثم قمنا بتبسيط PN-drahمعضلة (
ة للأمان في أنظمة المرحلات ذات . أما بالنسب )eulavnegie dezilareneg(المسألة باستخدام ال 
الاتجاهين فإننا درسنا الأمان في حالة ان معلومة قناة المتنصت متوفرة وأيضا عندما تكون غير متوفرة. في 
) عندما تكون  etar mus ycercesحال توفر معلومة قناة المتنصت قمنا بتعظيم معدل مجموع الأمان (
لة تم إثباتها انه مسألة معقدة  لكن تم حلها بطريق قريبة من الحل مجموع طاقة الأجهزة محدودة. هذه المسأ
) والتي بدورها تم إثباتها gnimrofmaeb ecaps llunالأمثل والتي تسمى إعدام الإشارة عند المتنصت (
) إيجاد الحل الأمثل لطريقة 1أنها أيضا مسألة معقدة. ولذلك نحن هنا اقترحنا حلين منفصلين لهذه المشكلة: 
) والتي QROI) إيجاد حل شبه مثالي عند طريق تجاهل بعض أجزاء المسألة (2إعدام الإشارة عند المتنصت 
تفوق الطريقة الأولى خاصة عندما يكون عدد المرحلات قليلة. أما اذا كانت معلومة حالة قناة المتنصت غير 
.  طريقة حل هذه المسألة هي شبيه معروفة فإننا اعتمدنا التشويش الصناعية لتشوية الإشارة عند المتنصت
  vix
 
بالطريقة التي تم فيها حل مسألة تقليل الطاقة في المرحلات ذات الاتجاه الواحد. حيث ان طريقتنا يمكن 
وعندما تكون مصفوفة دالة الهدف  2عندما لا يتجاوز عدد القيود   PQCQاستخدامها لحل كل المسائل 
 مصفوفة معرفة موجبة.
 
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Recently, it has become clear that wireless communication systems have a great
impact on the way people contact with each other. Wireless communications pro-
vide mobility and flexibility which are not provided by wired networks. Wireless
systems are also suitable for short-term and quick networks operating for tempo-
rary events such as some activities or exhibitions. Besides, wireless networks are
developing and prospering very fast without stop which enables them to provide
higher rates and be widely deployed to cover wide area. The most important
resources in wireless networks are power and bandwidth, where the demand for
high information rates that need such precious resources is increasing. Many re-
searchers are working in improving the information rate where many solutions
have been proposed, for instance, the relaying schemes, multiple-input-multiple-
output (MIMO) antenna technique, cognitive radio and power allocation. Relay-
ing schemes in wireless networks are used to extend the coverage of the wireless
networks when the distance between transceivers is long. There are always some
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cases that the intended receiver is located out of the range of the transmitter.
Therefore, users that are able to receive the transmitted signals can forward the
signals that are not intended for them to the intended users. Briefly, in coopera-
tive communications, end users exchange their information through intermediate
nodes which in turn receive the signals, decode or amplify them, then forward
them to the end users. There are several relaying schemes that signify the job
of relays in the system such as compress and forward (CF), decode and forward
(DF), and amplify and forward (AF). The simplest relaying scheme is AF as it
amplifies the received signal and directs it to the receiver without any processing,
detection, or delay. In CF, relays quantize the received signal then forward it
to the receiver. The destination needs more information than AF to uncompress
the signal, and the relays require higher computational complexity than AF to
compress the signal. In DF, relays firstly decode the received signal, encode it
again, then forward it to the intended receiver. There are two types of relaying
system: one-way relay system (OWRS), and two-way relay system (TWRS).
Since wireless networks are widely spread and used in many applications, the
study of security in wireless networks becomes more crucial. There are always
cases where some nodes (eavesdroppers) desire to overhear the messages that are
intended for the legitimate destination. Consequently, secure communications is
an essential issue in wireless communications to protect confidential messages.
The goal of secure communications is to receive confidential messages while keep-
ing the eavesdroppers ignorant. That was the reason behind the emergence of
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information theoretic secrecy which has recently been considered as an encourag-
ing way to handle the secure communications. In wireless networks, the broadcast
and superposition characteristics represent various challenges in guaranteeing se-
cure communications in the existence of eavesdroppers. The broadcast attribute
of wireless communications facilitates the eavesdropping while superposition at-
tribute can cause an overlapping of several signals at the destination which enables
the eavesdropper to act as a jammer to degrade the signal at the legitimate re-
ceivers [1]. Usually, traditional secure communication approaches are built based
on a secret key that is controlled at the network layer. The problem in this tech-
nique is that the distribution of the secret key in a wireless environment can be
observed by unintended users. Additionally, the network layer security is based
on the assumption that it is impossible to decode the information signals without
the knowledge of the secret key, whereas this is not proven mathematically. The
premise of physical layer security is to utilize the artificial noise and the CSI be-
tween the legitimate transceivers and source-eavesdropper channel (if available)
to limit the information rate that can be attained by an unauthorized user, and
keep the quality of the signal at the legitimate receiver acceptable. It is assumed
that the eavesdropper has the global knowledge of the CSI of all nodes and has
no limit in the resources to decode the information signal. Research in physical
layer security can be classified based on the state of the eavesdropper whether he
is active or passive. When the eavesdropper is assumed active, the CSI of the
eavesdropper can be attained and exploited to minimize the rate at the eaves-
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dropper. Whereas, if the eavesdropper is assumed passive, i.e. trying to hide his
presence by not participating in the transmission, the appropriate way is to emit
a jamming signal in all directions because the CSI of eavesdropper is unknown.
Multiple antennas are used to enhance the secure communications by beamform-
ing the information signal towards the legitimate destinations and protect it from
eavesdropping or attacking. Relays play a great role in improving the physical
layer security by cooperating with each other to strengthen the information rate
at legitimate receiver and weaken the information rate at unauthorized users by
operating as virtual multiple antennas.
Our aim in this thesis is to handle the physical layer security in TWRS and in
OWRS when each node in the system has a single antenna and are working under
half duplex constraint. When the global CSI is available, these systems are studied
in terms of maximizing the secrecy capacity subject to the total or individual
power constraint and minimizing the total power with satisfying the required QoS
constraints. When CSI of the eavesdropper is not available, the available power
at the relays is divided into two parts: one part is devoted to amplify and forward
the information signals and the remain of the power is devoted to generate an
artificial noise to jam the eavesdroppers.
1.1 Background
In this section, some concepts and theoretical details are introduced regarding
the work of this thesis. Cooperative communications and relaying networks, and
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their schemes used to forward the information signal between the transceivers
are discussed. In addition, the concept of eigenvalues and eigenvectors is pre-
sented in order to show how to maximize or minimize a quadratic problem or a
Rayleigh quotients (RQ). Most of our problems are formulated as optimization
problems, and hence convex optimization is important to be introduced in this
section including the Lagrange duality, KKT conditions, semidefinite program-
ing, and optimizing RQ. Finally, physical layer security in direct and relaying
transmissions is introduced.
1.1.1 Cooperative Communications
In this section, we present the principle of cooperation in communication systems,
especially in wireless communications. Channels in wireless networks experience
fading; meaning that there is a significant variation in the signal attenuation when
it is transmitted over a wireless channel. One common solution to mitigate fading
is to enable the receiver to receive multiple realizations of the transmitted signal.
This technique is called diversity which can take different forms such as space
diversity, time diversity, and frequency diversity. Due to the limited resources
of user devices; e.g., power, complexity and size, cooperative communications
have emerged to overcome these limitations since network nodes equipped with a
single antenna can work together to creat a virtual antenna beam, targeting the
MIMO advantages. In other words, relay nodes can work together to create a
communication link between transceivers to strengthen the information signal at
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the destination. In a cooperative environment, each user may act as a transceiver
or as a relay that first receives the transmitted signal and then retransmits it to
the destination. There are several relaying schemes that can be used in relaying
systems such as
Amplify and forward (AF)
In this scheme, relays just weight the received signal by an amplification factor,
then forward it to the receiver without any detection. The amplification or weight
factor can be chosen to beamform the information signal to some direction.
Decode and Forward (DF)
In DF, firstly, each relay demodulates and decodes the received signal, then re-
encodes the information signal, using the same or another code, and retransmits it
to the receiver. DF relaying is an obstacle for physical layer security when the relay
cannot be considered as a trusted node. Its ability to decode the information signal
makes it easy to overhear the information signal. Therefore, some other techniques
such as jamming should be applied to prevent the opportunity of eavesdropping.
Compress and forward (CF)
In CF, relays quantize the received signal and forward it to the receiver. Because
compression is required, it needs more computation than AF, and at the receiver
end, additional information may be required to uncompress the received message.
Among different relaying schemes, the AF scheme is the simplest one as
6
it does not intend to detect the received signal and it does not require any
computations at relays or destination [15]. As a result, AF is adopted in this
thesis for all the proposed systems.
There are two types of relaying system that are constrained to be half du-
plex; OWRSs and TWRSs. Fig. 1.1 shows a OWRS where there are only one
transmitter, one destination, and one or multiple relays. In the first time slot,
the transmitter broadcasts the message towards relays, then the relays amplify or
decode the received signal (based on the relays’ scheme) and forward it for the
destination. In two-way relaying systems, which is shown in Fig. 1.2, the system
comprises of two transceivers and one or several relays. In the first time slot, both
transceivers transmit their signals towards the cooperative relays, while at the
second time slot the relays amplify the signal or decode it (based on the relays’
scheme) and forward it to the transceivers.
Figure 1.1: OWRS
7
Figure 1.2: TWRS
1.1.2 Eigenvalue and Eigenvector
In this part, we will introduce the fundamentals of the eigenvalue and eigenvector.
Any symmetric or Hermitian matrix A can be decomposed as
A = UHDU, (1.1)
where U is an orthonormal matrix whose columns are the eigenvectors of A,
and D is a diagonal matrix whose elements are the eigenvalues of A. If the
matrix A is Hermitian or symmetric, the eigenvalues λ1(A), λ2(A), ..., λn(A) are
real. The eigenvalues can be obtained by solving the characteristic polynomial
det(A − λI) = 0. If A is square (i.e., number of columns equal to number of
rows), we can find the the eigenvalue and eigenvector of A2 as
A2v = λAv = λ2v.
Generally, for the matrix Ak, the eigenvalue will be λk while the eigenvector will
not change. The trace and determinant of the matrix A can be expressed using
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eigenvalues as follows:
det(A) =
n∏
i=1
(λi),
trace(A) =
n∑
i=1
(λi).
The matrix A is called positive definite if for all nonzero vector w, wHAw > 0. In
other words, all the eigenvalues of the matrix A are positive. On the other hand,
if all the eigenvalues of the matrix A are negative, A is called a negative definite.
Also, if λmin(A) = 0, A is called positive semidefinte matrix. Similarly, A is
called negative semidefinite matrix if λmax(A) = 0. If the matrix A has positive
and negative eigenvalues, A is called an indefinite matrix. In this context, we
denote a positive semidefinite matrix by A < 0, a positive definite matrix by
A Â 0 and we use A < B to denote that A−B < 0. We are also interested in the
generalized eigenvalues and generalized eigenvectors. The generalized eigenvalues
obtained by solving the equation det(xB−A) = 0, where B Â 0. In other word,
the generalized eigenvalues is the eigenvalues of the matrix (B−1A).
1.1.3 Convex optimization
Any optimization problem, in general, can be written as minimizing an objective
function subject to a group of constraints. The regular form of an optimization
9
problem is
min
x
f0(x) (1.2a)
s.t fi(x) ≤ 0, i = 1, 2, ., n (1.2b)
hj(x) = 0 j = 1, 2, .,m (1.2c)
where x is the vector of optimization variables which can also be formed as a scalar,
a vector or a matrix, f0 is the cost function, fi, i = 1, .., n, represent the inequality
constraint functions, and hj , j = 1, .,m,represent the equality constraint functions.
If there is x that achieves all the constraints, we can define the problem as feasible;
if not, it is infeasible. The vector that minimizes the objective function among all
vectors and achieves all constraints is called the optimal solution of Problem (1.2)
and we denote it by x∗. Problem (1.2) is considered to be a linear programming if
the objective and the constraint functions are affine. Any function is called affine
or linear if it satisfies the following condition:
f(αx1 + βx2) = αf(x1) + βf(x2) (1.3)
for all x1, x2 ∈ Rn and α, β ∈ R. On the other hand, Problem (1.2) can be
classified as a convex problem if the cost and constraint functions are all convex
[27]. The function f is called convex if it satisfies
f(φx1 + (1− φ)x2) ≤ φf(x1) + (1− φ)f(x2), (1.4)
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where 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1. Similarly, the function f is called concave if it satisfies
f(φx1 + (1− φ)x2) ≥ φf(x1) + (1− φ)f(x2), (1.5)
where 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1. It can be seen from (1.3) and (1.4) that any linear optimization
problem is convex while a convex problem is not necessarily linear. Therefore,
convexity is more general then linearity [27]. There is also another way to check
the problem if it is convex or not by checking the first and the second order
conditions. To check the first order condition, under the assumption that the
function f is differentiable, the function f is considered as a convex if and only if
its domain is convex and f(w) ≥ f(v) + ∇f(v)T (w − v), for all v, w ∈ dom(f).
The second order condition states that under the assumption that f is double
differentiable, that is, ∇2f exists at every point in its domain, which is open.
Therefore, f is considered convex if and only if its domain is convex and ∇2fº 0:
for all x ∈ dom(f). The first step to solve any optimization problem is to prove
whether it is convex or not. Knowing the convexity of the problem can make
optimization in some sense simpler than the general case. Convexity means that
it contains only one minimum value which is considered as a global minimum.
When a problem is shown to be convex or can be reformulated into a convex
problem, it can be directly solved by the well known tools, such as SEDUMI [2]
or CVX [3].
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Lagrange dual function
Considering the optimization problem (1.2) as the primary problem, the dual
problem can be formulated from the primary problem by adding the cost function
with the summation of weighted constraint functions. Generally, the Lagrangian
dual function of Problem (1.2) is given by
Γ(x, λ, v) = f0(x) +
m∑
i=1
λifi(x) +
n∑
i=1
vifi(x) (1.6)
Where λi and vi are the Lagrange multiplier associated with the i
th inequality and
ith equality constraints, respectively. The dual function can be expressed as:
g(λ, v) = inf
x∈D
(f0(x) +
m∑
i=1
λifi(x) +
n∑
i=1
vihi(x)). (1.7)
Assuming that P ∗ is the optimal solution of the primal problem (1.2) and q∗ is
the optimal solution of the dual problem (1.7), the following relation always is
true with λ ≥ 0 ,
q∗ ≤ p∗.
Generally, the solution of the dual problem and that of the primary problem would
not be the same. Therefore, the Lagrange dual problem must be formulated to
provide the tightest lower bound that can be attained from the dual function
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which is
max
λ,v
g(λ, v) (1.8a)
s.t λ ≥ 0. (1.8b)
Here, we introduce the Slater’s condition which states that the objective func-
tions of the primal and dual problems will be equal (i.e., strong duality holds), if
there exists a feasible point x at which the inequality constraints hold with strict
inequalities and the primal optimization problem is convex.
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions
Assuming that the objective and constraint functions of an optimization problem
are differentiable and satisfy Slater’s condition, any pair of primal and dual op-
timal points have to achieve the KKT conditions. When the orignal problem is
convex, the KKT conditions are sufficient for the primal and dual variables to be
optimal. If x∗, λ∗, v∗ are any points that satisfy the following KKT conditions:
fi(x
∗) ≤ 0 i = 1, .,m (1.9a)
hi(x
∗) = 0, i = 1, p (1.9b)
λ∗i ≥ 0, i = 1, .,m (1.9c)
λ∗i fi(x
∗) = 0, i = 1, ..,m (1.9d)
f0(x
∗) +
∑
λ∗i∇fi(x∗) +
∑
v∗i∇hi(x∗) = 0 (1.9e)
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Then x and (λ, v) are the primal and dual optimal points with zero duality gap.
SDP
In our work, we will use a category of the convex optimization problems that is
known as semidefinite programming. SDP is to minimize or maximize an affine
objective function over a constraint that contains symmetric or Hermitian posi-
tive semidefinite matrices [39]. This constraint is convex but nonlinear and not
smooth. Therefore, semidefinite programming problems are considered to be con-
vex optimization problems [39]. Semidefinite programming is not much more
difficult than linear programming even though they are much more general. The
appropriate approach to solve the SDPs is the interior-point method. In general,
we can express a semidefinite program as
min
X
tr(XA0) (1.10a)
s.t tr(XAi) = bi, i = 1, ,m (1.10b)
X < 0 (1.10c)
This is called the primal expression of SDP. The dual optimization problem of
SDP can be written as follows:
min
y
bTy (1.11a)
s.t F(y) º 0 (1.11b)
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where F(y) = F0 +
∑m
i=1(yiFi),F0,F1, .,Fm are Hermitian matrices.
Optimizing Rayleigh quotient
The generalized Rayleigh quotient (RQ) is defined as follows
F (x) =
xHAx
xHBx
, (1.12)
where A is a symmetric matrix and B Â 0. The solution vector of maximizing
the function F(x) is x∗ = vmax(B−1A) and the solution vector of minimizing the
function F(x) is x∗ = vmin(B−1A).
1.1.4 Physical layer security
In this section, we introduce various physical layer security systems and the mea-
surement metrics used to evaluate them. The simplest system investigated with
physical layer security is that comprising of three terminals; source, legitimate
receiver and eavesdropper. This system is shown in Fig. 1.3, in which the source
desires to transmit a private message to the destination while the eavesdropper
attempts to get a version of the transmitted message. The secrecy capacity of the
system illustrated in Fig. 1.3 is provided in [3] as follows:
SC = CD − CE,
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where CD is the Shannon capacity of the destination channel and CE is the Shan-
non capacity of the eavesdropper channel.
Figure 1.3: The simplest physical layer security system
It can be seen that a positive secrecy capacity can be attained if the authorized
user channel is an upgraded version of the eavesdropper channel. The represen-
tation of the secrecy capacity is generalized in [4] to cover the case that the
eavesdropper channel is a non-degraded form of the intended receiver. Therefore,
the secrecy capacity is
SC = I(xs; yD)− I(xs; yE)
where yD is the received signal at the destination, yE is the received signal at
eavesdropper, respectively, xs is the transmitted symbol and I(.; .) denotes the
mutual information. The system illustrated in Fig. 1.3 assumes that each node
has one antenna. If both source and receiver or one of them have more than
one antenna, this can improve the secrecy capacity. Multiple antennas have been
exploited to intensify the physical layer security using spacial diversity. In case
CSI of the eavesdropper is known, MIMO can simultaneously null the information
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signal at the eavesdropper and beamform it at the intended receiver [5]. Whereas,
if CSI is unavailable some antennas can be used to emit artificial noise and the
others can be used to beamform the signal to maximize it at the destination [6].
The idea of artificial noise is to allocate a portion of the transmitted power to gen-
erate and send a jamming signal. This artificial noise is distributed isotropically
to interfere eavesdroppers since the location of them is unknown. In addition,
under the assumption that the eavesdroppers are active, the source may also ex-
ploit the eavesdroppers’ CSI to beamform or direct the artificial noise toward the
eavesdropper for more efficient jamming such as the so-called interference align-
ment and cooperative jamming. In case of multiple input single output multiple
eavesdropper (MISOME), if the CSI is available, the optimal beamforming vector
is the generalized eigenvector related to the maximum eigenvalue of the matrix
H−1e h
H
d hd, where hd,He are main channel matrix and the wiretap channel ma-
trix, respectively [5]. In case each node has multiple antenna (MIMOME), at high
SNR, the asymptotic optimal approach is to use the generalized singular value de-
composition (GSVD) of the matrix H−1e Hd, where Hd is the main channel matrix
[7]. In general, the secrecy capacity of MIMO system can be expressed as in [6]
SC = maxQ<0(log det (I + HdQHd)− log det(I + HeQHe)),
where Q is the input covariance matrix.
The physical layer security has also been studied in cooperative systems
wherein the relays can cooperate to direct the transmitted signal to the desti-
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nation and degrade it at the eavesdroppers. Relays can work as relaying elements
or cooperative jammers to improve the secure communications. In OWRSs, the
secrecy rate is used to measure the effectiveness of physical layer security that can
be expressed as follows:
RS = 0.5 log(1 + SNRD)− 0.5 log(1 + SNRE),
where SNRD, SNRE are the SNRs at the destination and eavesdropper, respec-
tively. In TWRSs, another metric used to measure the performance of the secure
transmission called secrecy sum rate which can be expressed as follows:
Rsum = 0.5 log(1 + SNR1) + 0.5 log(1 + SNR2)− 0.5 log(1 + Ie,1 + Ie,2
N
),
where SNR1 and SNR2 are the SNR at the source S1 from S2 and the SNR at
the source S2 from S1, respectively, and Ie,1 and Ie,1 are the information signal
powers of the messages coming form the source 1 and source 2 at the eavesdropper,
respectively. Generally, the predominant techniques of secure communications in
relaying systems are optimal beamforming, null space beamforming, and cooper-
ative jamming. Usually, optimal beamforming can be attained if the CSI of the
eavesdropper is available and the relays use DF technique [8], [9]. In case AF
technique applied, the optimal beamforming cannot be attained easily because
of the non-convexity of the problem, null space beamforming has been proposed
as a suboptimal approach in which all relays cooperate to null the information
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signal at eavesdropper in the second phase [8], [10], [11]. Additionally, cooperative
jamming has been proposed as a common solution for secure communications in
both cases if the CSI of the eavesdropper is available or unavailable.
1.2 Literature Review
Physical layer security has attracted a large research interest as an important
component of future wireless technology. In this part, we present the previous
work of the physical layer security in direct communications and relaying systems.
1.2.1 Direct Communications
The simplest system that has been investigated is that which comprises of three
terminals: transmitter, destination, and eavesdropper. Wyner [12] started to
study the most basic physical layer security by showing that better secrecy ca-
pacity can be attained in the discrete memoryless wiretap channel if the source-
destination channel is an upgraded version of the source-eavesdropper channel.
Wyner defined the secrecy capacity of its proposed system as the highest infor-
mation rate that can be achieved at the destination while maintaining the eaves-
dropper totally unaware of the transmitted signals. Authors of [4] generalized
Wyner’s work in case the transmitter wants to transmit confidential messages to
Receiver 1 and public messages to both Receiver 1 and Receiver 2 while main-
taining Receiver 2 as uninformed of the private messages as possible. The work
of Wyner was also extended in [13] to the Gaussian channel, while an efficient
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design of the secrecy scheme with flat fading channel was designed in [14]. The
achievable secrecy rate for an AWGN transmitter-receiver channel is studied by
[15] when the transmitter- eavesdropper channel is Rayleigh fading with additive
Gaussian noise, where the CSI is known for the transmitter and receiver. They
deduce that a positive secrecy rate is attainable when artificial noise is injected to
jam the eavesdropper. Using MIMO in the physical layer security has attracted
many researchers and engineers to enhance the secrecy in wireless networks. Mul-
tiple antennas has been investigated in [16] when the source has a single antenna
and the receiver has multiple output (SIMO) aiming to show that multiple an-
tennas would be helpful in improving secrecy rate. The work in [5] investigated
the physical layer security if the channel is multiple input single output (MISO).
Authors in [5] showed that multiple antennas at the source can provide the abil-
ity of beamforming to eliminate the eavesdropper rate and maximize the rate
at the destination. In [6], Authors studied the physical layer security when the
transmitter has multiple antenna while receiver and eavesdroppers have only one
antenna. They devoted a portion of the power as an artificial noise to confuse
the eavesdropper, then they studied two optimization problems: minimizing the
total power under QoS on the legitimate receiver and the eavesdroppers, and
maximizing the receiver SNR under total power constraints and eavesdroppers
SNR. Authors of [7] and [17] studied secure communications when the channel is
MIMO. In [7], Authors showed that at high SNR, high secrecy capacity can be
achieved by simultaneously diagonalizing the channel matrices using the GSVD,
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and independently coding over the resulting parallel channels. When only the
statistical information of the eavesdropper’s channel is available, authors of [18]
and [19] proposed to emit an artificial noise to jam the eavesdropper. The artifi-
cial noise is designed to be orthogonal with the legitimate destination to get only
the eavesdropper suffered. If the CSI of the eavesdropper channel is incompletely
known, the artificial noise can be directed to some extent to the eavesdropper [20].
1.2.2 OWRS
It is known that even if each user is equipped with one antenna, they can work
together to create a distributed multiple antennas system by relaying. There are
several relaying schemes that can be used such as AF, DF and CF. In [21] and
[22], a relay cooperation technique is proposed with one cooperative node for one
direction transmission to improve the secure communications. For more than one
relay, authors of [8] investigated secure communications via cooperative relays un-
der DF, AF and cooperative jamming (CJ) under total power constraint. In [8],
the closed-form optimal solution for DF with the presence of one eavesdropper is
derived. In addition, if more than one eavesdropper is present, the total signal
transmitted from relays is designed to be completely eliminated at the eavesdrop-
pers in both schemes DF, AF. Whereas, for cooperative jamming, the complete
jamming signal transmitted by relays is totally eliminated at the legitimate re-
ceiver. Additionally, they studied the total power minimization under secrecy
rate constraint when null space beamforming is applied. A closed form solution
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for this was provided. Authors of [9] proposed iterative algorithms for secrecy rate
maximization under both total power constraint and individual power constraint
in the presence of multiple relays. Authors of [9] used the bisection algorithm with
the feasibility problem while the objective function is not guaranteed to have only
one global optimal solution. To decrease the high operational complexity such as
information transfer and synchronization between multiple relays, authors in [23]
tried to combine the relay selection scheme and cooperative beamforming. Par-
ticularly, with full CSI and high SNR, the authors proposed selecting two relays
to cooperate to null the signal at the eavesdropper. When only the phase of in-
formation is fed back between transceivers, authors in [23] proposed a distributed
phase alignment and relay selection technique that modify the transmit phase at
each selected relay. Physical layer security in OWRSs was also investigated by [24]
using two different techniques which are beamforming with DF relaying scheme
and CJ when one or more eavesdroppers are present. In [25], the authors tried to
obtain the optimal beamforming vector of the relays but the optimal solution is
not guaranteed because of the semidefinite relaxation (SDR) and aiming to avoid
the complexity they proposed the null space beamforming as a suboptimal solu-
tion. Authors in [26], considered a system where there is only one relay and each
terminal in the system has multiple antennas. They separated the channels in the
system into parallel independent channels using SVD and GSVD. SVD is applied
at relays beamforming while GSVD is applied at the source to diagonalize the
transmitter-relays channels. In [27], physical layer security is investigated in the
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existence of one helper with multiple antennas. The mission of the helper in the
system of [27] is only to jam the eavesdropper without participating in relaying
the information signal between the transceivers. For OWRSs, the best choice for
the jammers location is to be in the vicinity of the legitimate receiver which has
been proposed by [28]. Two approaches have been proposed in [28] namely, coor-
dinated cooperative jamming and uncoordinated cooperative jamming. Authors
of [29] examined a single hop system where the destination emits an artificial noise
to jam the eavesdropper. When only the channel statistical information of the
eavesdropper is known, authors of [30] investigated the secure communications
under DF relaying scheme. They selected the best relay to forward the message
while the rest of relays are determined to confuse the eavesdropper by jamming
signal. In [31], Authors adopted the null space beamforming in a multiuser peer-
to-peer relay system for secrecy rate maximization by optimizing the joint source
and beamforming powers subject to SNR constraints at each user. They showed
that the problem is difficult to optimize, then they employed a sequential para-
metric convex approximation approach and proposed an algorithm to develop a
solution for the nonconvex problem.
1.2.3 TWRS
All the aforementioned work focuses on the physical layer security in unidirec-
tional transmission. In [32], authors studied the physical layer security in TWRS
with one untrusted relay that may work as a helper or eavesdropper. While se-
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cure communications in TWRS system has been investigated with one cooperative
node and one eavesdropper in [33]. For more than one relay, the authors of [34]
examined the physical layer security when each relay has more than one antenna.
In [10] and [11], the secure communication in TWRS has been studied in the ex-
istence of multiple distributed relays and one eavesdropper. The secrecy sum rate
has been suggested as a metric to measure the effectiveness of the system for secure
communications. The beamforming vector problem of TWRS with multiple relays
is formulated as a product of three RQs which makes it hard to obtain the optimal
solution. A suboptimal solution has been proposed where the beamforming vector
was designed so as to cancel the information signals at the eavesdropper in the
second phase. However, the information signals cannot be eliminated perfectly at
eavesdropper since it can receive a version of the signal directly from the trans-
mitters in the first phase. The purpose of this suboptimal solution is to reduce the
optimization problem of the beamforming vector to a product of two generalized
RQ. When CSI is unavailable, authors of [10] use SOCP to solve the optimization
problem that minimize the information signal power under QoS constraints to re-
serve high power for the artificial noise. Authors of [11] also studied the problem
of the total power minimization under individual secrecy rates when the null space
beamforming is applied, where SDP and sequential quadratic programming are
applied to find the optimal beamforming vector. In [35], the authors proposed a
combination of cooperative beamforming and jamming to improve the secure com-
munication in both transmission phases with individual power constraint. Also,
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in the case of full CSI of the eavesdropper is not available, the problem can be
converted to SDP with a rank one constraint. Instead of semidefinite relaxation
(SDR) and randomization techniques, authors of [35] used a penalty function ap-
proach and proposed an iterative algorithm to find the weight vector of relays.
Secure transmission techniques are examined in [36] for a multi-antenna bidirec-
tional system with network coding when eavesdroppers exist. For the reason that
the eavesdropper can obtain two versions of the transmitted signal, the nodes in
[36] jam the eavesdropper during both phases. In [37], authors selected two or
three relay nods to cooperate to jam the eavesdropper efficiently in TWRS. Au-
thors of [38] maximized the secrecy sum rate for TWRS when the CSI is not fully
available and each relay possesses only a single antenna.
1.3 Thesis Motivation
In this thesis, we study the secure communication in OWRS and TWRS. Gen-
erally, our objectives are to improve the secure communications in OWRS and
TWRS, and to minimize the required power with achieving a predefined secrecy
rate. Here, we outline our motivation and objectives in OWRS and TWRS.
1.3.1 OWRS
The power of relays minimization under information rates constraints
As mentioned in the literature review, Authors of [8] investigated the problem of
the total power minimization under secrecy rate constraint in case the null space
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beamforming is applied. This stimulates us to generalize the problem and study it
when the eavesdropper information rate is not allowed to exceed some threshold.
Therefore, the problem is formulated as the power of relays minimization under in-
formation rate constraints (destination and eavesdropper) when the source power
is individually constrained. The problem can be expressed as follows:
min
w,Ps
wHB0(Ps)w (1.13a)
s.t. wHB1(Ps)w ≥ 1 (1.13b)
wHB2(Ps)w ≤ 1, (1.13c)
Ps ≤ P1 (1.13d)
where Ps is the source power, P1 is the maximum available source power, w ∈ CN ,
w is the beamforming vector at relays, B0(Ps) ∈ CN×N is a Hermitian positive def-
inite matrix and a function of Ps, and B1(Ps), and B2(Ps) ∈ CN×N are indefinite
Hermitian matrices and functions of Ps. For the beamforming vector, although
the Problem (1.13) is considered to be a QCQP which is NP-hard problem [39],
it can be solved by converting it to a SDP or SOCP. Despite the complexity of
SDP is in order of O((M + N)7), where N is the dimension of the column or
the row in B0 (number of relays), and M is the number of the trace constraints,
it is shown in [40] that SOCP suffers from higher complexity than the SDP ap-
proach. Motivated by this, we introduce a novel approach to solve Problem (1.13)
with significantly less complexity. In addition, proposing an efficient solution for
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Problem (1.13) that can be used for all (QCQPs) with positive definite objective
function and two constraints.
Secrecy rate maximization under total power constraint
Although the secure communications in OWRS has been studied extensively, the
optimal solution of the achievable secrecy rate maximization under total power
constraint has not been achieved yet. The optimization problem is a product of
two RQ which is considered as a hard problem [10], [8]. That was the motivation
to develop an efficient method to obtain the optimal beamforming vector and
show how much it can improve the secure communications.
1.3.2 TWRS
If the global CSI is known
From the above literature, it can be seen that the optimal weight vector and the
power of sources that maximize the achievable secrecy sum rate with total power
constraint are difficult to obtain. For the beamforming vector, the problem can
be formulated in general as follows:
max
w
wHA1w
wHA2w
.
wHA3w
wHA4w
.
wHA5w
wHA6w
. (1.14a)
where w ∈ CN , w is the beamforming vector, and N is the number of relays,
A1,A3 and A6 ∈ CN×N are positive semidefinite Hermitian matrices, while A2,A4
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and A5 ∈ CN×N are diagonal positive definite Hermitian matrices that change ac-
cording to the channels between the different nodes in the system. Problem (1.14)
is neither concave nor convex which makes it difficult to solve. In [10], [11] and
[35] a suboptimal approaches is adopted which is called null space beamforming
to solve problem (1.14). The idea in null space beamforming is to design the
weight vector w to be in the null space of the eavesdropper channel vector for
completely eliminating the eavesdropper information rate attained in the second
phase. This suboptimal approach reduces the original problem into a product of
two RQs which can be written as:
max
q
qˉHAˉ1qˉ
qˉHAˉ2qˉ
.
qˉHAˉ3qˉ
qˉHAˉ4qˉ
(1.15a)
s.t ‖qˉ‖2 = 1, (1.15b)
where qˉ ∈ CN−2, and Aˉ1 and Aˉ3 ∈ CN×N are positive semidefinite Hermi-
tian matrices, while Aˉ2 and Aˉ4 ∈ CN×N are a diagonal positive definite Hermitian
matrices. Problem (1.15) is also hard to tackle which compel the aforementioned
literature to propose suboptimal solutions for the problem (1.15). The advantage
of the null space beamforming is that as the number of relays increases (goes to
infinity), the optimal null space beamforming approach (the available in the litera-
ture is a suboptimal solution) rapidly approaches the optimal solution of Problem
(1.14). On the other hand, the disadvantage of the null space beamforming ap-
proach is that it is inefficient when the number of relays is small since the weight
vector needs to be orthogonal with two vectors which means that the available
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dimensions to beamform the information signal towards sources are only N − 2
dimensions. Besides, it is not applicable when the number of relays N < 3. Moti-
vated by what is mentioned above, the problem is tackled using two approaches:
1) We will propose a suboptimal solution for problem (1.14) that is efficient
when the number of relays is low.
2) In case the null space beamforming is applied, we will obtain the optimal
weight beamforming vector. In other words, we will find the optimal solution of
the problem (1.15).
If the CSI of eavesdropper is unknown
In this case, we will investigate the artificial noise proposed in [10] for the beam-
forming vector to jam the eavesdropper. The problem was expressed as minimizing
the information transmission power under QoS to reserve the remain of the power
for the artificial noise. The problem can be expressed as follows:
min
w
wHG0w (1.16a)
s.t. wHG1w ≥ 1 (1.16b)
wHG2w ≥ 1, (1.16c)
where G0 ∈ CN×N is a Hermitian positive definite matrix, and G1, and G2 ∈
CN×N are indefinite Hermitian matrices. In order to avoid the SDP complexity,
we develop our novel approach that used to solve Problem (1.13) to tackle Problem
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(1.16).
1.4 Organization and Contribution
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows:
In Chapter 2, we consider a OWRS which consists of one source, one desti-
nation, multiple cooperative relays and one eavesdropper using AF scheme. The
total power of relays is minimized under information rate constraints (destination
and eavesdropper) when the power of the transmitter is individually constrained.
This problem is equivalent to minimizing the cost of forwarding the information
signal when the relays do not forward the signal for free, which stimulate the
source-destination pair to minimize the relays power where the source has a lim-
ited power. When the source power is given, the problem is formulated as a
nonconvex QCQP. The optimal solution is guaranteed by reformulating the prob-
lem as a SDP that uses interior point method. Instead using SDP that suffers from
high complexity, we propose a novel approach using generalized eigenvalue that
provides a closed form solution in most cases. Then we prove that as the source
power increases, the relays power will decrease provided that the eavesdropper
constraint is satisfied.
In Chapter 3, we investigate the system adopted in Chapter 2 where the prob-
lem of maximizing the secrecy rate by looking for the optimal weight vector of the
relays is solved. We show that the optimization problem is hard to tackle. Then,
we convert the problem from N -dimensional search to one dimensional search with
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implementing SDP problem, where N is the number of relays. Then we signif-
icantly simplify the problem by solving it using a series of eigenvalue problems
and providing an efficient algorithm. Briefly, we provide the optimal beamforming
vector that has not been provided yet. Compared to the null space beamforming,
we prove that the optimal beamforming vector just provides a slight improvement
for the secure communication especially in a high number of relays.
In Chapter 4, we study the secure communications in a TWRS comprising of
two transceivers, one eavesdropper, and several relays. The system is studied in
case the CSI of the eavesdropper is available. The problem of maximizing the
secrecy sum rate is adopted under total power constraint. For the beamforming
vector, until now, suboptimal solutions have been proposed for the null space
beamforming in the literature. Accordingly, in Chapter 4, we propose two ap-
proaches: 1) the optimal null space beamforming approach, 2) Ignoring one RQ.
In the first approach, for beamforming vector, we convert the nonconvex product
of two RQs to a convex problem with one dimensional search using semidefinite
programming (SDP). Then we significantly simplify the problem using the gener-
alized eigenvalues. While for sources power, we solve the problem using Newton
algorithm. In the second approach, we deal with beamforming vector that does
not cancel the information signal at the eavesdropper aiming to increase the whole
secrecy sum rate. Therefore, we ignore one Rayleigh quotient out of three that
has less impact on the whole function and optimize the problem.
In Chapter 5, we investigate the secure communications in the same system
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studied in Chapter 4 in case the CSI of the eavesdropper is unobtainable, and
hence artificial noise is applied to impair the information signal at the eaves-
dropper. In order to reserve the maximum possible power for artificial noise, the
problem of minimizing the total power of the information signal transmitted by
the relays under QoS constraints at the transceivers is considered. This problem
has been solved using SDP and SOCP methods. Here, aiming to significantly de-
crease the complexity, we propose a novel approach to obtain the optimal solution
using the generalized eigenvalue. We show that in most cases, we can provide a
closed-form expression of the optimal solution. In addition, our proposed solu-
tion can be used for all quadratically constrained quadratic programs (QCQPs)
with positive definite objective function and two constraints. Simulation results
demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithm in terms of optimality and low
complexity compared to SDP.
In Chapter 6, we conclude the thesis by highlighting the core contributions
and conclusions achieved in this work. Moreover, some future work in the physical
layer security in relay system is proposed.
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CHAPTER 2
RELAYS TOTAL POWER
MINIMIZATION UNDER
SECRECY CONSTRAINT IN
OWRS
In this chapter, we consider a OWRS which consists of one transmitter, one re-
ceiver, multiple cooperative relays and one eavesdropper using amplify and for-
ward (AF) scheme. Each node in the system has only one antenna, and is working
under half duplex constraint. We minimize the power of relays under information
rate constraints for both the legitimate destination and the eavesdropper when
the source power is individually constrained. This problem is required to be stud-
ied when the source-destination pair must pay to the relays for forwarding the
transmitted signal, which stimulates the source-destination pair to minimize the
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power of relays when the source has a limited power. When the source power is
given, the problem is formulated as a non-convex QCQP. The optimal solution is
guaranteed by reformulating the problem as SDP that uses interior point method.
Instead of using SDP that suffers from high complexity, we propose a novel ap-
proach using generalized eigenvalue that provides a closed form solution in most
cases. Then we prove that as the source power increases, the relays’ total power
will decrease as long as the eavesdropper constraint is feasible. Simulation results
demonstrate that the proposed approach achieves the optimal solution of the relay
beamforming vector with significant lower complexity.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows, the system model is introduced
in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3, we present the achievable secrecy rate. Section 2.4
is devoted for the problem formulation and proposed solution. numerical results
is showed in Section 2.5 and we present the conclusion in Section 2.6.
2.1 System Model
We propose a OWRS that comprises a source S, a destination D, an eavesdropper
E, and N trusted relay nodes. Each node in the system has only single antenna,
and is working under a half duplex constraint. The system is investigated ac-
cording to the assumption that the global CSI of the eavesdropper is available.
This CSI can be attained if the eavesdropper is active and its transmission can
be observed. It is assumed that a direct connection between the transmitter and
both the eavesdropper and legitimate receiver is not available. The codewords at
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the source are assumed to be Gaussian. We assume that each channel is a block
fading channel that changes from one block to another according to a Rayleigh
distribution. We denote by fR the complex transmitter-relay nodes channel gain
vector (N ×1), by gd the relays-destination channel vector (N ×1), and by ge the
complex relays-eavesdropper channel gain vector. In amplify and forward scheme,
Figure 2.1: System model
the signal is transmitted over two time slots. In the first one the transmitter
broadcasts the signal to the cooperative relays. The received signal at the relays
can be written as:
yR =
√
PsfRx + nR, (2.1)
where Ps is the power of the transmitter, x is the symbol transmitted by the
source with unit power, and nR is the complex Gaussian noise vector at the
relays with zero mean and variance σ2RIn. In the second phase, each trusted relay
weights the noisy received signal, then retransmits it to the receiver. Therefore,
the transmitted signal of all relays can be expressed as diag(w)yR, where yR is
given by (2.1), and w is the complex beamforming vector that weights the received
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signal at the relays. Therefore, the received signal at the destination attained from
the second phase can be expressed as:
y
(2)
D =
√
Psw
Hafdx + w
HGdnR + nD, (2.2)
where Gd = diag(gd), afd = G
H
d fR and nD is the additive zero mean noise
with σ2D at destination. The eavesdropper can receive a version of the information
signal which can be written as:
yE =
√
Psw
Hafex + w
HGenR + nE, (2.3)
where Ge = diag(ge), afe = G
H
e fR, and nE is the additive zero mean noise with
variance σ2E at the eavesdropper.
2.2 Achievable Secrecy Rate
In this section, we formulate the information rate received at the intended receiver,
the information rate received at the eavesdropper, and the secrecy rate. From
(2.2), the information rate attained at the destination can be written as follows:
Rd =
1
2
log(1 +
Psw
HRfdw
σ2D + σ
2
Rw
HRggw
), (2.4)
where Rfd = afda
H
fd, Rgg = G
H
d Gd. The scalar factor
1
2
is due to that the trans-
mitted signal consumes two time slots. Similarly the information rate attained at
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the eavesdropper is
Re =
1
2
log(1 +
Psw
HRfew
σ2E + σ
2
Rw
HReew
), (2.5)
where Rfe = afea
H
fe, Ree = G
H
e Ge. The secrecy rate as shown in [5] , [17] and [8]
can be expressed as follows:
Rs =
1
2
log(1 +
Psw
HRfdw
σ2D + σ
2
Rw
HRggw
)− 1
2
log(1 +
Psw
HRfew
σ2E + σ
2
Rw
HReew
). (2.6)
The relays’ transmit power can be obtained by
Pr = E{(diag(w)yR)H(diag(w)yR)} = wHTw,
where T is a diagonal matrix T = PsF + σ
2IN , where F = diag(f
H
R )diag(fR).
2.3 Power of Relays Minimization
In this section, we minimize the power of relays under a given information rate
constraints in the legitimate destination and the eavesdropper when the source
power is individually constrained. We intend to find the optimal beamforming
vector w and the source power Ps that minimize the relays’ total power and
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achieve the given information rates. The problem can be written as follows:
min
w,Ps
wH(PsRff + σ
2IN)w (2.7a)
s.t 0.5 log(1 +
Psw
HRfdw
σ2D + σ
2
Rw
HRggw
) ≥ rd, (2.7b)
0.5 log(1 +
Psw
HRfew
σ2E + σ
2
Rw
HReew
) ≤ re, (2.7c)
Ps ≤ P1, (2.7d)
where rd and re are the minimum required information rate at the destination
and the maximum allowable eavesdropper’s information rate, respectively, and
P1 is the maximum available source power. Problem (2.7) is not convex, and
hence it is difficult to solve for the global optimal. Therefore, we obtain the
optimal beamforming vector when the source power is fixed, then we propose an
algorithm that guarantees the joint global optimal solution (P ∗s ,w
∗).
2.3.1 Beamforming Vector Optimization
Here, we solve Problem (2.7) when the source power Ps is fixed. Therefore, the
problem is equivalent to minimize the relays transmit power under information
rate constraints. Define δ ∈ [0, 1], δ = re
rd
; the ratio of the allowable maximum
eavesdropper’s information rate to the minimum destination’s information rate.
The problem is written as:
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min
w
wH(PsRff + σ
2IN )w (2.8a)
s.t wH(PsRfd − tdσ2RRgg)w ≥ σ2Dtd (2.8b)
wH(PsRfe − teσ2RRcc)w ≤ σ2Ete, (2.8c)
where td = 2
2rd − 1, and te = 22δrd − 1. Let B0 = (PsRff + σ2IN), B1 =
1
σ2Dtd
(PsRfd − σ2RtdRgg) and B2 = 1σ2e te (PsRfe − σ
2
RteRcc). Therefore, we can
rewrite (2.8) as:
min
w
wHB0w (2.9a)
s.t. wHB1w ≥ 1 (2.9b)
wHB2w ≤ 1, (2.9c)
B0 can be shown to be a positive definite matrix, while B1 and B2 are indefinite
matrices. Problem (2.9) is a not convex QCQP problem, but it can be reformu-
lated as a SDP with rank constraint as:
min
W
tr(WB0) (2.10a)
s.t. tr(WB1) ≥ 1 (2.10b)
tr(WB2) ≤ 1 (2.10c)
W º 0, Rank(W) = 1. (2.10d)
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The constraint (2.10d) guarantees that the matrix W can be written as W =
wwH . Problem (2.10) is not convex because of the rank constraint of W. In
[41], it was shown that if the number of the trace constraints is n, then the global
optimal solution matrix W will have a rank r ≤ √n. Here, in Problem (2.10), the
number of trace constraints is two traces which means that the solution matrix
W will definitely have rank one, and hence Problem (2.10) is equivalent to the
following problem
min
W
tr(WB0) (2.11a)
s.t. tr(WB1) ≥ 1 (2.11b)
tr(WB2) ≤ 1 (2.11c)
W º 0, (2.11d)
where the optimal beamforming vector w is the eigenvector related to the
non-zero eigenvalue of the optimal W. Although, SDP can provide the optimal
beamforming vector, it suffers from high complexity. Authors of [11] show that
the complexity of SDP problem is O((N + K)7), where K is the number of the
trace constraints and N is the row or column dimension of B0 (number of relays).
Therefore, here we propose an alternative solution for the SDP problem that
provides the optimal beamforming vector with significant decrease in complexity.
First, it is direct to show that in Problem (2.11), the first inequality constraint
(2.11b) achieved with equality at optimality. If not, the beamforming vector can
be scaled down to enforce the constraint to be active without violating the second
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constraint, which causes a diminution in the objective function. Whereas this is
not applied for the second constraint.
Theorem 2.1 If the constraint (2.11c) does not hold with equality which means
that only constraint (2.11b) holds with equality, the optimal beamforming vector
is w∗ = w1 = 1√
vH1 B1v1
v1 , where v1 = vmax(B
−1
0 B1).
Proof. The problem in (2.11) is convex given that the objective and the con-
straints functions are convex. In addition, Problem (2.11) satisfies Slater’s condi-
tion which states that strong duality holds if there exists a feasible point at which
the inequality constraints hold with strict inequalities and the primal optimiza-
tion problem is convex (details in [42]). Thus, the KKT conditions are sufficient
and necessary for a primal-dual point to be optimal. The Lagrangian function of
problem (2.11) is
Γ = tr(WB0)− tr(WQ)− β0tr(WB1) + β1tr(WB2) + β0 − β1, (2.12)
where β0 ≥ 0, β1 ≥ 0 and Q º 0 are the Lagrangian dual variables. The KKT
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conditions are:
dΓ
dW
= B0 −Q∗ − β∗0B1 + β∗1B2 = 0 (2.13a)
tr(W∗B1)− 1 ≥ 0 (2.13b)
tr(W∗B2)− 1 ≤ 0 (2.13c)
tr(W∗Q∗) = 0 (2.13d)
β∗0tr(W
∗B1)− β∗0 = 0 (2.13e)
β∗1tr(W
∗B2)− β∗1 = 0 (2.13f)
W∗ º 0, Q∗ º 0 β∗0 ≥ 0 β∗1 ≥ 0. (2.13g)
From KKT conditions, in particular (2.13a), the dual optimization problem can
be written as
max
β0,β1
β0 − β1 (2.14a)
s.t. B0 − β0B1 + β1B2 º 0, (2.14b)
β0 ≥ 0, β1 ≥ 0. (2.14c)
Under the assumption that the constraint (2.11c) does not hold with equality, β∗1
must be zero to satisfy the KKT conditions. Therefore, problem (2.14) can be
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written as:
max
β0,β1
β0 (2.15a)
s.t. B0 − β0B1 º 0, (2.15b)
β0 ≥ 0. (2.15c)
In fact, it can be seen that (2.11b) holds with equality while (2.11c) doesn’t when
tr(W∗B1) > tr(W∗B2) and w∗HB1w∗ > w∗HB2w∗. Furthermore, at optimality,
both the objective function of the primal and dual optimization problems are
equal, β∗0=tr(W
∗B0)=
tr(W∗B0)
tr(W∗B1)
=w
∗HB0w∗
w∗HB1w∗
. In addition, from the constraint (2.15b)
we have I º β∗0B−10 B1, so 1β∗0 I º B
−1
0 B1,
1
β∗0
≥ λmax(B−10 B1) which means that
the maximum value of β∗0 is
1
λmax(B
−1
0 B1)
. Hence,
w∗HB1w∗
w∗HB0w∗
=
1
β∗0
= λmax(B
−1
0 B1). (2.16)
The optimal beamforming vector that satisfies (2.16) is vmax(B
−1
0 B1) =v1. But
we have to scale the solution vector to satisfy the constraints since the scaling
does not affect on the relation (2.16). Hence, we have w∗= 1√
vH1 B1v1
v1 aiming to
have the constraint (2.11b) active while having the constraint (2.11c) strict.
It is important to say that, the constraint (2.11c) might or might not hold with
equality while the constraint (2.11b) always holds with equality, so we have only
two cases which are: 1) the first constraint only holds with equality. 2) both
constraints hold with equality. We have provided a closed form solution of the
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first case while in the following we propose an algorithm that provides a solution
for the second case. Obviously, Both constraints hold with equality means that
β∗0 > 0 and β
∗
1 > 0, which means that
1√
vH1 B1v1
v1 cannot be a solution for the
problem (2.9). We propose another solution for Case 2, other than the SDP
approach to avoid the complexity. The problem (2.11) can be written as:
min
W
tr(WB0) (2.17a)
s.t tr(WB1) = 1 (2.17b)
tr(WB2) = 1 (2.17c)
W º 0, (2.17d)
Theorem 2.2 the optimal solution vector of Problem (2.17) is a weighted version
of the optimal solution vector of the following problem
max
V
tr(VB1) (2.18a)
s.t tr(VB0) ≤ 1 (2.18b)
tr(VB1) = tr(VB2) (2.18c)
V º 0. (2.18d)
In other words, w∗= 1√
v∗HB1v∗
v∗, where the optimal solution v∗ is the solution
vector of the problem in (2.18), where V = vvH .
44
Proof. Assuming W = wwH , if we substitute w by 1√
vHB1v
v, we can write the
problem in (2.17) as
min
v
vHB0v
vHB1v
(2.19a)
s.t.
vHB1v
vHB1v
= 1 (2.19b)
vHB2v
vHB1v
= 1. (2.19c)
The constraint (2.19b) can obviously be removed, and using the inverse of the
objective function in (2.19a), the problem in (2.19) can be written as:
max
v
vHB1v
vHB0v
(2.20a)
s.t. vHB2v = v
HB1v. (2.20b)
The expression vHB0v is considered as a normalizing vector that can be con-
verted to a constraint vHB0v = 1, and hence both Problems (2.20) and (2.17) are
equivalent.
In the following, we provide a simple and efficient algorithm to find the optimal
vector v∗, in order to avoid the complexity of the SDP approach. The dual
problem of problem (2.18) can be written as
min
α,μ
α (2.21a)
s.t. −B1 + αB0 − μ(B2 −B1) º 0, (2.21b)
α ≥ 0 (2.21c)
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From (2.21b), we can write α as
αI º (1−μ)B−10 B1 + μB−10 B2.
Therefore, the optimal value of α must satisfy that
α∗ = min
μ
λmax((1−μ)B−10 B1 + μB−10 B2).
Here, we raise a question: what is the relation between α∗ and v∗?. Let x =
vmax((1− μ∗)B−10 B1 + μ∗B−10 B2), then
α∗ = xH((1− μ∗)B−10 B1 + μ∗B−10 B2)x = (1− μ∗)
xHB1x
xHB0x
+ μ∗
xHB2x
xHB0x
.
From the convexity of the problem and the fact that Slater’s condition is satisfied,
it can be shown that strong duality holds for the Problem (2.17). Therefore, the
optimal solution of the primal and dual problems are equal; i.e., α∗ = v
∗HB1v∗
v∗HB0v∗
,
and μ must be selected to satisfy v∗HB1v∗ = v∗HB2v∗. Therefore,
α∗ =
v∗HB1v∗
v∗HB0v
= (1− μ∗)v
∗HB1v∗
v∗HB0v∗
+ μ∗
v∗HB2v∗
v∗HB0v∗
= (1− μ∗)x
HB1x
xHB0x
+ μ∗
xHB2x
xHB0x
, and hence,
v∗ = x = vmax((1− μ∗)B−10 B1 + μ∗B−10 B2). (2.22)
In order to find v∗, we use the bisection algorithm to find the optimal value
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of μ which must yield a vector v∗ that satisfies the equality v∗HB1v∗=v∗HB2v∗
with a tolerance of ². Therefore, the following algorithm is used to find v∗.
Algorithm 2.1 Find the beamforming vector for Problem (2.9) when both con-
straints are active.
1. Determine the maximum and minimum value of μ; i.e. define μmin and
μmax (finding μmax and μmin is explained after Step 5).
2. Let m = (μmin + μmax)/2, then find v = vmax((1 − μ)B−10 B1 + μB−10 B2)
with μ = m.
3. If vHB1v < v
HB2v, μmax = m, else if v
HB1v > v
HB2v , μmin = m.
4. If |vHB1v−vHB2v| ≤ ε, μ∗ = (μmin+ μmax)/2, otherwise go back to step
2.
5. Find v∗ = vmax((1− ˉ∗)B−10 B1 + μ∗B−10 B2) then find w∗= 1√v∗HB1v∗v
∗.
μmin and μmax should be determined to achieve that v
H(μmin)B1v(μmin) <
vH(μmin)B2v(μmin) and v(μmax)
HB1v(μmax) > v(μmax)
HB2v(μmax); i.e, there is
a cross point between μmin and μmax which guarantees that v
HB1v = v
HB2v.
Therefore, the algorithm to solve Problem (2.9) to obtain w∗ is
Algorithm 2.2 Finding the optimal beamforming vector of Problem (2.9) when
the source power is fixed.
1. find w1=
1√
vH1 B1v1
v1.
2. If w1 is feasible,w
∗ = w1
3. If w1 is infeasible, use Algorithm 2.1 to have the optimal vector.
2.3.2 Source power Problem
In this section, we obtain the optimal source power that minimizes the relays’
transmit power. As demonstrated before that the constraint (2.11b) must be ac-
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tive (holds with equality) to minimize the relaying transmit power, and increasing
Ps enforces the relays to decrease their power aiming to satisfy the same infor-
mation rate at the receiver and keep the eavesdropper information rate under the
given threshold. In other words, increasing the power of the source relaxes the
objective function (2.8a) to some extent from the constraints (2.8b) and (2.8c).
Therefore, the optimal value of the source power for the optimization problem
(2.11) is it’s maximum value (i.e., P ∗s = P1 ) provided that Problem (2.11) is
feasible. Otherwise, source power Ps should be decreased until Problem (2.11) be
feasible.
Here, we propose an algorithm that provides the joint optimal solution (P ∗s ,w
∗)
which minimizes the power of relays:
Algorithm 2.3 Algorithm for finding the joint optimal solution for Problem (2.8).
1. Given the maximum available source power P1, use Algorithm 2.2 to solve
Problem (2.11) to obtain the beamforming vector when Ps = P1.
2. If Problem (2.11) is not feasible,
3. Ps = P1 −ΔP1,
4. else break,
5. (where ΔP1 is a very small positive value compared to P1).
6. Repeat step 1 and 2 until we get Problem 2.8 feasible, otherwise, Ps will
reach zero which means that the information rates (rd and re ) cannot be
achieved with the given channels.
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2.4 Simulation Results
In this part, the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms are evaluated. In each
simulation result, we generate all the channels randomly as independent complex
Gaussian random variables with zero mean and unit variance. All SDPs are solved
efficiently using interior point method provided by Matlab CVX toolbox [3]. We
obtain the results by averaging over 2000 Monte Carlo channel realization. In
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Figure 2.2: comparison of our Algorithm 2.3 that uses our proposed solution to
find w and Algorithm 2.3 that uses SDP with different number of relays, δ = 0.1,
and P1 = 15 dBW.
Fig. 2.2, we implement Algorithm 2.3 for the power of the relays minimization
by finding the joint optimal solution (P ∗s ,w
∗) versus the minimum required in-
formation rate at the destination for various number of relays when re = 0.1rd
and the maximum available power at the source is P1 = 15 dBW . We obtain the
beamforming vector in Algorithm 2.3 (step 1) using two approaches: SDP and our
proposed Algorithm 2.2, and we show that both approaches provide an identical
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Figure 2.3: comparision of our Algorithm 2.3 that uses our proposed solution to
find w and Algorithm 2.3 that uses SDP when both constraints are assumed to
hold with equality with different number of relays, δ = 0.1, and P1 = 15dBW.
solution which means that our novel approach provides the optimal solution (w∗)
exactly as SDP. Also, it can be seen that the power of relays increases with the
minimum destination information rate requirement. This is because increasing
the required rd needs to increase the power of relays to fulfill the requirements.
It is also shown that increasing the number of relays improves the performance of
the physical layer security system because of the array gain.
In Fig. 2.3, we implement a special case of our optimization problem where it is
assumed that the information rates in both the destination and the eavesdropper
must satisfy with equality; i.e., the exact rd and re, where δ = 0.1, and P1 =
15 dBW . In other words, we compare the SDP (2.17) with the proposed Algorithm
2.1. Similar to Fig. 2.2, the results in Fig. 2.3 show that for different number
of relays and different minimum required information rate at destination, both
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Figure 2.4: The average ratio of execution time spent by implementing our ap-
proach with relative SDP approach against the minimum required information
rate at destination , N=4, N=7, N=10, δ = 0.1 and P1 = 15dBW
the SDP approach and our proposed algorithm provide the same optimal solution
vector and the same relays transmit power.
In Fig. 2.4 we compare the computational complexity of SDP approach and
our approach (Algorithm 2.2) in terms of the execution time. We plot the average
percentage ratio of the execution time consumed by the proposed solution with
respect to the SDP approach. It is shown that our algorithm provides substan-
tially less computational complexity than the SDP approach where on average, it
consumes only 1.7% of the time consumed by SDP which confirms what stated
before that the complexity of implementing SDP is O((M + N)7), which is much
more complex than implementing the eigenvalue problem that has O(N3) compu-
tational complexity.
Similarly, in Fig. 2.5, when both constraints are assumed to hold with equality,
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Figure 2.5: The average ratio of execution time spent by implementing our ap-
proach with relative SDP approach when both constraints hold with equality
against the required minimum information rate at destination, N=4, N=7, N=10,
δ = 0.1 and P1 = 15 dBW .
we compare the computational complexity of the SDP approach and Algorithm
2.1 in terms of the execution time. We plot the average ratio of execution time
consumed by the proposed solution with respect to the SDP approach. Although
our Algorithm 2.1 proposes a series of eigenvalues problem to provide the optimal
beamforming vector, it is shown that Algorithm 2.1 provides substantially less
computational complexity than the SDP approach where, on average, consumes
about 1.45%, 2.3%, and 3.2% of the time consumed by SDP in case of 4, 7, and
10 relays, respectively.
In Fig. 2.6, we show the relation of the achievable power of relays and the
minimum destination information rate for a different values of the source power.
As demonstrated before increasing the maximum available source power helps in
decreasing the minimum required power of relays to satisfy the given rates. To
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Figure 2.6: the relation of the achievable power of relays and the minimum desti-
nation information rate with a different values of of the source power.
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Figure 2.7: the power of relays against the total available power at source with
various number of relays node.
show the relation between P1 and the minimum required power of relays more
clearly, we illustrate in Fig. 2.7 the power of relays versus the maximum available
power at source with different number of relays node. We can see that the amount
of enhancing the power of relays goes down as the power source increase. This is
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Figure 2.8: The achievable power of relays against the minimum requirement of
the destination information rate with different values of δ
because as shown in the objective function of Problem (2.9) as the source power
increases the rate of decreasing of the relaying power will decrease.
In Fig. 2.8, the achievable power of relays is plotted against the minimum
requirement of the destination information rate with different values of δ (i.e.,
different values of re corresponds to rd). It is shown that as δ increases, the
achievable power of relays goes up. This is due to the reason that increasing re
is freeing the objective function of Problem (2.9) to a certain degree. In other
words, weakening the secrecy constraints helps in decreasing the required power
of relays.
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2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, the physical layer security in a OWRS with several relays in
the existence of an eavesdropper was investigated. The problem is formulated
as minimizing the relaying power under information rate constraints. Then, the
joint optimal solution source power and beamforming vector were obtained. A
novel approach was proposed to solve the QCQP that also can be solved using
SDP approach. The proposed algorithm provided the same optimal solution that
can be achieved using SDP with dramatically reduced computational complexity.
Furthermore, it was shown that increasing the maximum available source power
helps in decreasing the minimum required relaying total power to satisfy the given
rates.
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CHAPTER 3
IMPROVING THE PHYSICAL
LAYER SECURITY IN OWRS
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we improve the secure communications in OWRS by secrecy rate
maximization when the total power has to be below a given value. We study
the same system proposed in Chapter 1 with same specifications and constraints.
Our goal in this chapter is to provide the optimal weight vector w that maximizes
the secrecy rate. It is shown in the literature review that the secrecy rate maxi-
mization has been handled extensively, whereas the optimal beamforming vector
has not provided yet. Therefore, we intend to find the optimal weight vector and
compare it with the suboptimal solutions provided in the previous work. Firstly,
we formulate the optimization problem with showing that it is non-convex. Then,
we convert the problem from N−dimensional search to one-dimensional search
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with a series of SDP problems. After that, we provide an efficient algorithm that
guarantees the optimal solution with less complexity.
3.2 Problem Formulation
In this section, we formulate the optimization problem which provides the optimal
weight vector to maximize the secrecy rate while keeping the total power under a
predefined value. The optimization problem can be expressed as follows:
max
w
Rs (3.1a)
s.t wHTw + Ps ≤ PT , (3.1b)
where Rs is given in (2.6), T = PsRff +σ
2IN , where Rff = diag(f
H
r )diag(fr), and
PT is total power available in the source and relays. Problem (3.1) is not convex
optimization problem and it is hard to tackle. In the following we reformulate the
problem as a convex with one dimensional search. It has been proved in [11] that
the constraint (3.1b) holds with equality at optimality. Thus, the optimization
problem to find the optimal weight vector for maximizing the secrecy rate can be
written as:
max
w
1
2
log(1 +
Psw
HRfdw
σ2D + σ
2
Rw
HRggw
) (3.2a)
−1
2
log(1 +
Psw
HRfew
σ2E + σ
2
Rw
HReew
) (3.2b)
s.t wHTw = Pr, (3.2c)
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where Pr is the total available power at relays; Pr = PT −Ps. We can rewrite
Problem (3.2) equivalently as follows:
max
w
(
σ2D+σ
2
Rw
HRggw+PswHRfdw
σ2D+σ
2
Rw
HRggw
)(
σ2E+σ
2
Rw
HReew
σ2E+σ
2
Rw
HReew+PswHRfew
), (3.3a)
s.t wHTw = Pr. (3.3b)
Let’s assume the unit norm complex vector wˉ such that T0.5w =
√
Prwˉ. Hence
wˉHwˉ = w
HTw
Pr
= 1, and w =
√
PrT
−0.5wˉ. Therefore, Problem (3.3) is equivalent
to
max
wˉ
wˉH(σ2D + Prσ
2
RT
−0.5RggT−0.5 + PsPrT−0.5RfdT−0.5)wˉ
wˉH(σ21 + Prσ
2T−0.5RggT−0.5)wˉ
.
wˉH(σ2E + Prσ
2
RT
−0.5ReeT−0.5)wˉ
wˉH(σ2E + Prσ
2
RT
−0.5ReeT−0.5 + PsPrT−0.5RfeT−0.5)wˉ
s.t ‖wˉ‖2 = 1.
(3.4a)
Let
Aˉ1 = σ
2
D + Prσ
2
RT
−0.5RggT−0.5 + PsPrT−0.5RfdT−0.5,
Aˉ2 = σ
2
D + Prσ
2T−0.5RggT−0.5,
Aˉ3 = σ
2
E + Prσ
2
RT
−0.5ReeT−0.5,
Aˉ4 = σ
2
E + Prσ
2
RT
−0.5ReeT−0.5 + PsPrT−0.5RfeT−0.5.
Therefore, we can rewrite Problem (3.4) as follows:
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max
wˉ
wˉHAˉ1wˉ
wˉHAˉ2wˉ
.
wˉHAˉ3wˉ
wˉHAˉ4wˉ
(3.5a)
s.t ‖wˉ‖2 = 1. (3.5b)
The constraint (3.5b) does not have an effect on the objective function value
because the maximum value of the objective function will be the same whatever
the norm of the vector is. Therefore, we can remove (3.5b) without affecting
the solution of Problem (3.5). After we get the optimal wˉ, we normalize it.
Although it is hard to find the optimal solution of the product of two Rayleigh
quotients (RQ), in the following we obtain the optimal solution for Problem (3.5)
by reformulating the problem into SDP with one dimensional search. We have that
λmin(Aˉ
−1
4 Aˉ3) ≤ wˉ
HAˉ3wˉ
wˉHAˉ4wˉ
≤ λmax(Aˉ−14 Aˉ3), where λmin(Aˉ−14 Aˉ3) is the minimum
eigenvalue of the matrix Aˉ−14 Aˉ3, and λmax(Aˉ
−1
4 Aˉ3) is the largest eigenvalue of the
matrix λmax(Aˉ
−1
4 Aˉ3). Let’s denote the product of two RQs function by Rq(wˉ) =
wˉHAˉ1wˉ
wˉHAˉ2wˉ
. wˉ
HAˉ3wˉ
wˉHAˉ4wˉ
, or Rq(wˉ) = u1u2, where u1 =
wˉHAˉ1wˉ
wˉHAˉ2wˉ
, and u2 =
wˉHAˉ3wˉ
wˉHAˉ4wˉ
. To obtain
the optimal values u1 and u2, we start by maximizing one of them while fixing
the other. Let’s rewrite the optimization problem (3.5) as follows:
max
wˉ
wˉHAˉ1wˉ
wˉHAˉ2wˉ
(3.6a)
s.t
wˉHAˉ3wˉ
wˉHAˉ4wˉ
= u2. (3.6b)
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The expression wˉHAˉ2wˉ is considered as a normalizing vector that can be
converted to a constraint wˉHAˉ2wˉ = 1. Therefore, Problem (3.6) can be written
as follows:
max
wˉ
wˉHAˉ1wˉ (3.7a)
s.t. wˉHAˉ3wˉ − u2wˉHAˉ4wˉ ≥ 0 (3.7b)
wˉHAˉ2wˉ = 1. (3.7c)
Problem (3.7) is a non-convex QCQP which is not easy to tackle. To solve problem
(3.7) we have to transform it into SDP with rank one constraint by introducing
the new variable Qˉ = wˉwˉH . Now, Problem (3.7) can be written as:
max
Qˉ
tr(Aˉ1Qˉ) (3.8a)
s.t tr(Aˉ3Qˉ)− u2tr(Aˉ4Qˉ) = 0 (3.8b)
tr(Aˉ2Qˉ) = 1 (3.8c)
Qˉ º 0, Rank(Qˉ) = 1 (3.8d)
The constraint in (3.8d) guarantees that the matrix Qˉ can be written as Qˉ =
wˉwˉH . Problem (3.8) is also not convex because the rank constraint of Qˉ. In
[41], it is shown that if the number of the trace constraints is n, we can obtain
a global optimal solution with rank r ≤ √n. Here in Problem (3.8), number of
trace constraints is two traces which means that the solution matrix is rank one.
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Therefore, Problem (3.8) is equivalent to the following convex problem:
max
Qˉ
tr(Aˉ1Qˉ) (3.9a)
s.t tr(Aˉ3Qˉ)− u2tr(Aˉ4Qˉ) = 0 (3.9b)
tr(Aˉ2Qˉ) = 1 (3.9c)
Qˉ º 0. (3.9d)
Problem (3.9) indicates that if we have the optimal value of u2 that max-
imize Rq(wˉ), we can find the optimal value of u1. Let’s denote the optimal
value of u2 and u1 that maximize the function Rq(wˉ) by u
∗
2 and u
∗
1, respec-
tively. Therefore, our problem now is to search for the optimal value u∗2 that
maximizes Rq(wˉ). As stated earlier: λmin(Aˉ
−1
4 Aˉ3) ≤ u∗2 ≤ λmax(Aˉ−14 Aˉ3). If we
choose wˉ to be the eigenvector related to the largest eigenvalue of the principle
matrix (Aˉ−14 Aˉ3); i.e., wˉ = vmax(Aˉ
−1
4 Aˉ3), the objective function Rq(wˉ) will be
Rq(wˉ) =
wˉHAˉ1wˉ
wˉHAˉ2wˉ
λmax(Aˉ
−1
4 Aˉ3). Define λ34 = λmax(Aˉ
−1
4 Aˉ3), λ12 = λmax(Aˉ
−1
2 Aˉ1),
σ34 is the maximum value of
wˉHAˉ3wˉ
wˉHAˉ4wˉ
when wˉ
HAˉ1wˉ
wˉHAˉ2wˉ
= λ12, and σ12 is the maximum
value of wˉ
HAˉ1wˉ
wˉHAˉ2wˉ
when wˉ
HAˉ3wˉ
wˉHAˉ4wˉ
= λ34. To obtain the value of σ12 we have two cases:
the first case if the λmax(Aˉ
−1
4 Aˉ3) is unique (i.e., λmax(Aˉ
−1
4 Aˉ3) is distinct), we will
choose wˉ to be the eigenvector associated λmax(Aˉ
−1
4 Aˉ3) and σ12 =
wˉHAˉ1wˉ
wˉHAˉ2wˉ
. The
second case if the matrix Aˉ−14 Aˉ3 has another eigenvalue equals to λmax(Aˉ
−1
4 Aˉ3)
(i.e., the maximum eigenvalue of matrix Aˉ−14 Aˉ3 is not unique), we have to obtain
the maximum value of σ12 by solving the SDP (3.9) when u2 = λmax(Aˉ
−1
4 Aˉ3).
Similarly, we can obtain σ34. Consequently, u1 cannot reach its maximum value
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if u2 > σ34. In problem (3.9), if we put u2 = λ34, the function Rq(wˉ) will be
equal to σ12λ34. On the other hand, if we put u2 = σ34, u1 will reach its maxi-
mum value λ12 then Rq(wˉ) = σ34λ12. While the maximum value of the function
is Rq(wˉ) ≥ max(σ12λ34, σ34λ12). It can be shown that the optimal value of u∗2
cannot be less than σ34. This is because as we decrease u2 below σ34, u1 will
be less than or equal to its maximum value, while u2 will keep decreasing which
means that the product of them will be definitely less than σ34λ12. Consequently,
u∗2 is bounded by σ34 ≤ u∗2 ≤ λ34. Similarly σ12 ≤ u∗1 ≤ λ12.
Lemma 3.1 Problem (3.9) is equivalent to the following problem:
max
Qˉ
tr(Aˉ1Qˉ) (3.10a)
s.t tr(Aˉ3Qˉ)− u2tr(Aˉ4Qˉ) = 0 (3.10b)
tr(Aˉ2Qˉ) ≤ 1 (3.10c)
Qˉ º 0, (3.10d)
Proof. It can be shown that the optimal solution of (3.10) must satisfy the
constraint (3.10c) with equality and hence it will be the same optimal solution
of (3.9). This is because if the solution of (3.10) satisfies (3.10c) with strict
inequality, we can always multiply Qˉ by a constant β > 1 to satisfy (3.10c)
with equality while increasing the objective function; since tr(Aˉ1Qˉ) < tr(βAˉ1Qˉ).
Also, the constraints (3.10b) and (3.10d) will remain satisfied; since tr(Aˉ3Qˉ) −
u2tr(Aˉ4Qˉ)) = βtr(Aˉ3Qˉ)− u2tr(Aˉ4Qˉ) = 0.
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Lemma 3.2 If (u2 > σ34), problem (3.10) is equivalent to the following problem:
max
Qˉ
tr(Aˉ1Qˉ) (3.11a)
s.t tr(Aˉ3Qˉ)− u2tr(Aˉ4Qˉ) ≥ 0 (3.11b)
tr(Aˉ2Qˉ) ≤ 1 (3.11c)
Qˉ º 0, (3.11d)
Proof. Problem (3.11) is convex considering that the objective and the con-
straint functions are convex. It can also be shown that the problem in (3.11)
satisfies Slater’s condition which states that the strong duality holds if there ex-
ists a feasible point at which the inequality constraints hold with strict inequalities
and the primal optimization problem is also convex (details in [42]). Thus, the
KKT conditions are sufficient and necessary for a primal-dual point to be optimal.
The Lagrangian function of problem (3.11) is
Γ =− tr(Aˉ1Qˉ))− tr(QˉQ) + β0tr(Aˉ2Qˉ))− β1tr(Aˉ3Qˉ)
+ β1u2tr(Aˉ4Qˉ)− β0,
(3.12)
where β0 ≥ 0, β1 ≥ 0 and Q º 0 are the Lagrangian dual variables. Define wˉo, βo0
and βo1 are the optimal primal and dual solutions when u2 is given, while wˉ
∗, β∗0
and β∗1 are the primal and dual optimal solutions when u2 is the optimal value
that maximize the Rq(wˉ) function; i.e., u2 = u
∗
2.
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Hence, the KKT conditions for a given u2 are:
dΓ
dQˉ
= Aˉ1 −Qo + βo0Aˉ2 + βo1(u2Aˉ4 − Aˉ3) = 0 (3.13a)
tr(QˉoAˉ2)− 1 ≥ 0 (3.13b)
tr(Qˉo(Aˉ3 − u2Aˉ4)) ≥ 0 (3.13c)
tr(QˉoQo) = 0 (3.13d)
βo0tr(Qˉ
oAˉ2)− βo0 = 0 (3.13e)
βo1tr(Qˉ
o(Aˉ3 − u2Aˉ4))− βo1 = 0 (3.13f)
Qˉo º 0, Qo º 0 βo0 ≥ 0 βo1 ≥ 0. (3.13g)
From (3.13a), the dual optimization problem can be written as follows:
min
β0,β1
β0 (3.14a)
s.t. −Aˉ1 + β0Aˉ2 + β1(u2Aˉ4 − Aˉ3) < 0, (3.14b)
β0 ≥ 0, β1 ≥ 0. (3.14c)
Since strong duality holds,
βo0 = tr(Aˉ1Qˉ
o) = u1 =
tr(Aˉ1Qˉ
o)
tr(Aˉ2Qˉo)
≤ λ12. (3.15)
From the constraint (3.14b), If we set β1 = 0 , β0 will be equal to λmax(Aˉ
−1
2 Aˉ1) =
λ12 which is its maximum value, which means that u2 = σ34. Therefore, if u2 > σ34
then β∗1 cannot be zero. Therefore, from the constraint (3.14c), we have β
o
1 > 0.
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From the KKT condition (3.13f), if βo1 > 0, then tr(Aˉ3Qˉ
o) − u2tr(Aˉ4Qˉo) = 0,
which means that the constraint (3.11b) holds with equality. As a result, problem
(3.11) and (3.10) are equivalent.
In case u2 = σ34, β
o
0 will reach its maximum value and u1 = λ12. In the following,
we propose an algorithm that guarantees the global optimal solution of the Rq(wˉ).
Algorithm 3.1 Finding the optimal null space beamforming vector qˉ by series
of SDPs
set u2 = u
(0)
2 : Δu2 : u
(m)
2 , and implement the SDP (3.11) with each value
of u2 to achieve the maximum value of Rq(wˉ), where u
(0)
2 = σ34, and u
(m)
2 = λ34,
and Δu2 is the step size.
This algorithm is highly complex since we need to implement bλ34−σ34
Δu2
c SDP’s
and we should have the value of Δu2 very small to obtain accurate optimal solu-
tion. We can adopt it as a benchmark to test if we achieve the optimal value or not.
Usually, interior point method is used to solve the SDP problems. Implementing
only one SDP is not considerd highly complex despite it needs O((M + N)7) in
the computational complexity, where M is the number of the traces constraint
and N is the dimension of the column or the row in Aˉ1 (number of relays). From
problem (3.14), we can rewrite the constraint (3.14b) as
β0Aˉ2 < Aˉ1 + β1Aˉ3 − β1u2Aˉ4.
Because Aˉ2 is a positive definite matrix, then
β0I < Aˉ−12 (Aˉ1 + β1Aˉ3 − β1u2Aˉ4). (3.16)
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From (3.16) and the optimization problem (3.14), we can express β0 as
βo0 = min
β1
λmax(Aˉ
−1
2 (Aˉ1 + β1Aˉ3 − β1u2Aˉ4)) (3.17)
Let y = vmax(Aˉ
−1
2 (Aˉ1 + β
o
1Aˉ3 − βo1u2Aˉ4)) which means that
βo0 = y
H(Aˉ−12 (Aˉ1 + β
o
1Aˉ3 − βo1u2Aˉ4))y
=
yHAˉ1y
yHAˉ2y
+ βo1
yHAˉ3y
yHAˉ2y
− βo1u2
yHAˉ4y
yHAˉ2y
.
(3.18)
From the condition (3.13f) and Lemma 3.2, at the optimality of problem (3.14),
βo1 must be selected to satisfy that wˉ
oHAˉ3wˉ
o−u2wˉoHAˉ4wˉo = 0. Therefore, from
(3.15), we can rewrite βo0 as
βo0 =
wˉoHAˉ1wˉ
o
wˉoHAˉ2wˉo
+ βo1
wˉoHAˉ3wˉ
o − u2wˉoHAˉ4wˉo
wˉoHAˉ2wˉo︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
(3.19)
From (3.18) and (3.19), we can show that the optimal solution vector of Problem
(3.9) is
wˉo = y = vmax(Aˉ
−1
2 (Aˉ1 + β
o
1Aˉ3 − βo1u2Aˉ4)). (3.20)
For a given u2, Problem (3.17) is a convex problem (details in [42]). Hence,
we use the bisection algorithm to obtain the optimal wˉo where βo1 is selected to
satisfy that wˉoHAˉ3wˉ
o = u2wˉ
oHAˉ4wˉ
o (aiming to satisfy the condition (3.13f))
with a given u2.
β1min and β1max should be determined to achieve that
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Algorithm 3.2 Obtain wˉo with a given u2
1. Determine the maximum and minimum value of β1; i.e., define β1min and
β1max (finding β1max and β1min is explained after).
2. Let β = (β1min + β1max)/2, then find wˉ = vmax(Aˉ
−1
2 (Aˉ1 + βAˉ3 − βu2Aˉ4)).
3. If wˉHAˉ3wˉ < u2wˉ
HAˉ4wˉ, β1max = β, else if wˉ
HAˉ3wˉ > u2wˉ
HAˉ4wˉ, β1min =
β.
4. If |wˉHAˉ3wˉ − u2wˉHAˉ4wˉ| ≤ ε, βo1 = (β1min+ β1max)/2, otherwise go back to
step 2.
5. Find wˉo = vmax(Aˉ
−1
2 (Aˉ1 + β
o
1Aˉ3 − βo1u2Aˉ4)).
wˉH(β1min)Aˉ3wˉ(β1min) < u2wˉ
H(β1min)Aˉ4wˉ(β1min) and wˉ
H(β1max)Aˉ3wˉ(β1max) >
u2wˉ
H(β1max)Aˉ4wˉ(β1max); i.e, there is a cross point between β1min and β1max
which guarantees that wˉHAˉ3wˉ = u2wˉ
HAˉ4wˉ.
Algorithm 3.2 is much simpler than implementing one SDP problem since
the implementing of the eigenvalue problem needs only to O(N3) computational
complexity. Therefor we can adopt Algorithm 3.2 instead of implementing SDP
problems for all possible values of u2. It guarantees the optimal solution, but we
intend to simplify it more. In the following, we propose a novel efficient algorithm
to provide the optimal wˉ∗ that maximizes the objective function of Problem (3.5).
Since βo0 = u1, we can claim that expression (3.17) is an expressing u1 in terms
of u2. Hence, we can rewrite the optimization problem (3.5) as follows:
max
u2
βo0u2 = max
u2
min
β1
λmax(Aˉ
−1
2 (u2Aˉ1 + u2β1Aˉ3 − β1u22Aˉ4)
= max
u2
wˉoH(Aˉ−12 (u2Aˉ1 + u2β
o
1Aˉ3 − βo1u22Aˉ4)wˉo
(3.21)
Lemma 3.3 At the optimality of Problem (3.5), we have β∗1 =
wˉ∗HAˉ1wˉ∗
u∗2wˉ∗HAˉ4wˉ∗
.
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Proof. At the optimality, we have that
β∗0u
∗
2 =
wˉ∗HAˉ1wˉ∗
wˉ∗HAˉ2wˉ∗
.
wˉ∗HAˉ3wˉ∗
wˉ∗HAˉ4wˉ∗
, (3.22)
and from equation (3.21)
β∗0u
∗
2 = wˉ
∗H(Aˉ−12 (u
∗
2Aˉ1 + u
∗
2β
∗
1Aˉ3 − β∗1u∗22 Aˉ4)wˉ∗
= u∗2
wˉ∗HAˉ1wˉ∗
wˉ∗HAˉ2wˉ∗
+ u∗2β
∗
1
wˉ∗HAˉ3wˉ∗ − u∗2wˉ∗HAˉ4wˉ∗
wˉ∗HAˉ2wˉ∗
(3.23)
It is obvious that the left hand side of equation (3.23) is equal to the right
hand side of that equation when β∗1 =
wˉ∗HAˉ1wˉ∗
u∗2wˉ∗HAˉ4wˉ∗
= wˉ
∗HAˉ1wˉ∗
wˉ∗HAˉ3wˉ∗
.
Consequently, we will exploit Lemma 3 to propose an efficient novel algorithm
that guarantees the optimal wˉ∗ with very less complexity.
From Lemma 3.3, we have λmin(Aˉ
−1
3 Aˉ1) ≤ β∗1 ≤ λmax(Aˉ−13 Aˉ1). We can reduce
the search space of β∗1 similar as we did for u
∗
2. From the fact that σ34 ≤ u∗2 ≤ λ34,
we have the maximum and minimum values of wˉHAˉ1wˉ are wˉ
H
1 Aˉ1wˉ1 and
wˉH2 Aˉ1wˉ2, respectively, where wˉ1 = vmax(Aˉ
−1
2 Aˉ1) and wˉ2 = vmax(Aˉ
−1
4 Aˉ3). Simi-
larly, the maximum and minimum values of wˉHAˉ3wˉ are wˉ
H
2 Aˉ3wˉ2 and wˉ
H
1 Aˉ3wˉ1,
respectively. Consequently,
min(
wˉH1 Aˉ1wˉ1
wˉH1 Aˉ3wˉ1
,
wˉH2 Aˉ1wˉ2
wˉH2 Aˉ3wˉ2
) ≤ β∗1 ≤ max(
wˉH1 Aˉ1wˉ1
wˉH1 Aˉ3wˉ1
,
wˉH2 Aˉ1wˉ2
wˉH2 Aˉ3wˉ2
). (3.24)
Let λ13 = max(
wˉH1 Aˉ1wˉ1
wˉH1 Aˉ3wˉ1
,
wˉH2 Aˉ1wˉ2
wˉH2 Aˉ3wˉ2
), and σ13 = min(
wˉH1 Aˉ1wˉ1
wˉH1 Aˉ3wˉ1
,
wˉH2 Aˉ1wˉ2
wˉH2 Aˉ3wˉ2
). Thus, the
algorithm to obtain the null space beamforming vector is
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Algorithm 3.3 Finding the optimal vector that maximize the product of two
RQ.
1. Give β1 any value between σ13 and λ13.
2. Search for u2 between σ34 and λ34 that maximize
wˉHAˉ1wˉ
wˉHAˉ2wˉ
. wˉ
HAˉ3wˉ
wˉHAˉ4wˉ
, where
wˉ = vmax(Aˉ
−1
2 (u2Aˉ1 + u2β1Aˉ3 − β1u22Aˉ4). (the procedures to look for u2
are summarized below).
3. Define a new value for β1 =
wˉHAˉ1wˉ
u2wˉHAˉ4wˉ
4. Back to step (2) until the value of u2 cannot improve the Rq(wˉ) anymore.
Algorithm 3.3 is based on enforcing the value of β1 to rapidly approach its
optimal value by implementing Step 3. To implement Step 2 of Algorithm 3.3,
we cannot use the bisection algorithm or any algorithm that is usually used for
the convex problems because of the non-convexity of the original problem. How-
ever, due to the simplicity of implementing the eigenvalue problem compared to
SDP since its complexity is O(N 3) which is much simpler than SDP approach,
exhaustive search might be suitable to look for the optimal u2 or we can adopt
the simple traditional random search algorithm [43] to look for u2. The steps to
obtain the optimal u2 using random search algorithm are: step 1) Set an initial
value for u
(0)
2 between λ34 and σ34, step 2) In the i
th iteration, generate a γi random
perturbation then update u
(i)
2 = u
(i−1)
2 + γi with assuring that u
(i)
2 must be in the
range σ34 ≤ u(i)2 ≤ λ34, then find wˉ = vmax(Aˉ−12 (u(i)2 Aˉ1 + u(i)2 β1Aˉ3− β1(u(i)2 )2Aˉ4),
after that check if the objective function wˉ
HAˉ1wˉ
wˉHAˉ2wˉ
. wˉ
HAˉ3wˉ
wˉHAˉ4wˉ
is improved, otherwise
u
(i)
2 = u
(i−1)
2 . Step 3) Repeat step 2) until the function
wˉHAˉ1wˉ
wˉHAˉ2wˉ
. wˉ
HAˉ3wˉ
wˉHAˉ4wˉ
does not
improve anymore or a certain number of iterations is implemented.
Then, the optimal beamforming vector can be obtained using the following
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equation
w =
√
PrT
−0.5wˉ (3.25)
3.3 Simulation Results
Here, the proposed physical layer security algorithms are evaluated. In our simu-
lation, we generate all the channels randomly as independent complex Gaussian
random variables with zero mean and unit variance. All SDPs are solved efficiently
using interior point method provided by Matlab CVX toolbox [3]. We obtain the
results by averaging over 2000 Monte Carlo channel realization.
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Figure 3.1: The comparison of the proposed Algorithm 3.3 and Algorithm 3.1
with various number of relays.
In Fig. 3.1, we show the comparison between the proposed Algorithm 3.3 and
the exhaustive search algorithm (Algorithm 3.1) in terms of secrecy rate against
the total available power when N = 6 and N = 4. For different values of the
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Figure 3.2: Comparison of the proposed Algorithm 3.3 and the Gradient descent
method.
total available power and various number of relays, It is shown that the proposed
Algorithm 3.3 provides the exact secrecy sum rate as exhaustive search grants
which means that Algorithm 3.3 provides the optimal null space beamforming
vector. In the exhaustive search, we perform 300 SDP to find the optimal solution
per one realization.
In Fig. 3.2, we compare our optimal solution for the beamforming vector and
the gradient decent method. As known, the gradient decent method does not guar-
antee the global optimal solution if the function has more than one local optimal
solutions. Therefore, Fig. 3.2 confirms that Algorithm 3.3 provides the global
optimal solution. In Fig. 3.3, the proposed optimal solution for beamforming
vector (Algorithm 3.3) and the null space beamforming approach are compared
in terms of secrecy rate versus the total available power. It is shown that there is
no significant improvement in secrecy rate especially when the number of relays
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Figure 3.3: Comparison of the proposed Algorithm 3.3 and null space beamform-
ing solution
is large. This is because that null space beamforming uses only one dimension
to completely eliminate the information signal at the eavesdropper while uses the
rest to maximize the destination’s information rate which is fair enough.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, the secrecy rate under total power constraint was maximized.
The problem was expressed as a product of two RQs. Then it was convert from
a nonconvex problem to a convex one with one dimensional search. After that,
an efficient algorithm that guarantees the global optimal solution was proposed.
Compared to the null space beamforming, we showed that the optimal beam-
forming vector just provides a slight improvement for the secure communication
particularly when the number of relays is large.
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Numerical results show that the optimal solution of maximizing the secrecy
rate is not that far from the null space beamforming approach.
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CHAPTER 4
IMPROVING THE PHYSICAL
LAYER SECURITY IN TWRS
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we investigate the physical layer security in TWRS. In [10] and
[11], authors studied the physical layer security in TWRS in the existence of mul-
tiple distributed relays and one eavesdropper. The secrecy sum rate has been
suggested as a metric to check the performance of the system for secure commu-
nication. The problem of TWRS with multiple relays is formulated as a product
of triple RQs which is hard to solve. A suboptimal solution has been proposed
where the beamforming vector designed to cancel the information signals at the
eavesdropper in the second phase. However, the information signals cannot be
eliminated perfectly at eavesdropper since he can obtain a version of the signal
directly from the transmitters in the first phase. Mathematically, the aim of this
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suboptimal solution is that the optimization problem of the beamforming vector
can be reduced to a product of two RQs.
In this chapter, considering the mixed signal received by the eavesdropper from
the first and second phase, we obtain the optimal solution of the channel null space
beamforming and the sources power for physical layer security in bidirectional
transmission. Our work is distinct from the work of [10] and [11] by that, 1) we
find the optimal beamforming vector (not suboptimal as given in [11]) when the
sources powers are given, 2) we consider the sources powers of the two phases
in the formulated optimization problem (unlike the solution given by [10]). The
optimization problem is formulated as maximizing the secrecy sum rate with total
power constraint. Then an iterative algorithm that finds both the beamforming
vector and the sources powers is proposed. For the beamforming vector, we convert
the non-convex product of two RQs to a convex problem with one dimensional
search using semidefinite programming (SDP). Then we significantly simplify the
problem using the generalized eigenvalues. While for the sources powers, when
the beamforming vector is given, the problem has been solved using Newton’s
algorithm. In addition, another suboptimal approach to maximize the secrecy
sum rate beside the optimal null space beamforming is proposed. This approach
outperforms the null space beamforming approach especially when the number of
relays is small. In our suboptimal solution, we simplify the problem by ignoring
one RQ out of three that has least impact on the whole function. This solution
provides a significant improvement in secrecy sum rate. In the numerical results,
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we demonstrate that the proposed algorithms provide better secrecy sum rate
than the previous work with different number of relays and different amount of
available power.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows; the system model is discussed
in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, we present the achievable secrecy sum rate, the
problem formulation, and proposed solutions. Simulation results are presented in
Section 4.4, and finally the chapter is concluded in Section 4.5.
4.2 System Model
The bidirectional communication system under consideration consists of a pair
of transceivers S1 and S2, one eavesdropper E, and N cooperative trusted relays
denoted as Ri, for i ∈ {1, 2, ...., N}. each node in the system has only a single
antenna and working under half duplex constraint. The system is investigated
under the assumption that the global CSI of all nodes even the eavesdropper is
known. As shown in Fig. 4.1, there is a direct channel between both transceivers
and the eavesdropper. The codewords at the transceivers are assumed to be
Gaussian. We assume that each channel is a block fading channel that changes
from one block to another according to a Rayleigh distribution. We denote by h1
, h2 the complex channel gain between the transceivers S1 and S2, and the relays,
respectively, by f1, f2 the complex channel gain between the transceivers S1 and
S2, and E, respectively, and by c the complex channel gain vector between the
relays and eavesdropper. We assume that there is no direct channel between the
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Figure 4.1: System model
transceivers. In amplify and forward scheme, the transmission of the signal takes
two phases, in the first phase, both transceivers broadcast their signals to the
cooperative relays. The received signal at the relays can be expressed as follows:
yR =
√
P1h1x1 +
√
P2h2x2 + nR, (4.1)
where yR ∈ RN is the received vector at the relays, P1 and P2 are the transmission
power of the transceivers S1, S2 respectively, x1, x2 are the symbols with unit
power transmitted by the transceivers S1 and S2, respectively, and nR is the
complex additive white Gaussian noise vector at the relays with covariance matrix
σ2RIN. On the other hand, the received signal at the eavesdropper in the first phase
can be written as:
y
(1)
E =
√
P1f1x1 +
√
P2f2x2 + ne1, (4.2)
where ne1 is the additive noise at the eavesdropper with variance σ
2
e1. In the second
phase, relays multiply the information signal by a complex vector w. Therefore,
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we can express the transmitted signal at the relays as:
xR = WyR, (4.3)
where yR is given by (4.1), and W is a diagonal matrix that contains the complex
weight vector of the relays W = diag(w). The received signals at the transceivers
can be written as:
yS1 =
√
P2w
Ha12x2 +
√
P1w
Ha11x1 + w
HH1nR + nS1, (4.4)
yS2 =
√
P1w
Ha12x1 +
√
P2w
Ha22x2 + w
HH2nR + nS2, (4.5)
where H1 = diag(h1), H2 = diag(h2), a12=H
H
1 h2, a11 = H
H
1 h1, a22 = H
H
2 h2, and
nS1 , nS2 are the additive zero mean noises with σ
2
1, σ
2
2 at S1, S2, respectively.
The terms
√
P1w
Ha11x1 in equation (5.2) and
√
P2w
Ha22x2 in equation (5.3)
are called the backward self-interference, and can be eliminated if each transmitter
knows its instantaneous channel and the beamforming vector w. Equations (5.2)
and (5.3) can be expressed as follows:
yS1 =
√
P2w
Ha12x2 + w
HH1nR + nS1, (4.6)
yS2 =
√
P1w
Ha12x1 + w
HH2nR + nS2, (4.7)
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while the received signal at the eavesdropper in the second phase is
y
(2)
E =
√
P2w
Hac2x2 +
√
P1w
Hac1x1 + w
HCnR + ne2, (4.8)
where C = diag(c), ac2=C
Hh2, ac1 = C
Hh1, and ne2 is the additive zero mean
noise with variance σ2e2 at eavesdropper in the second phase. Since the eaves-
dropper has two chances to get the information signal from the first and second
phase, it can use maximum ratio combining to maximize its SNR and create an
equivalent MIMO system. The received signal at the eavesdropper is
yE = Ex + ne, (4.9)
where yE =
 y
(1)
E
y
(2)
E
 , E =

√
P1f1
√
P2f2
√
P1w
Hac1
√
P2w
Hac2
 , ne =
 ne1
wHCnR + ne2
 , and s = [ s1 s2 ] .
Similar to the information rates given in OWRS, in TWRS, the information rate
at the transceivers can be written as:
RS1 =
1
2
log(1 +
P2w
HR12w
σ21 + w
Hσ2RR11w
), (4.10a)
RS2 =
1
2
log(1 +
P1w
HR12w
σ22 + w
Hσ2RR22w
), (4.10b)
where R12 = a12a
H
12, R11 = H1H
H
1 , R22 = H2H
H
2 . The information rate at
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eavesdropper is
RE =
1
2
log det (I + EEHN−1e ), (4.11)
where Ne is the covariance matrix of the received noise at eavesdropper which is:
Ne =
 σ2e1 0
0 σ2e2 + w
Hσ2RRccw
 . (4.12)
4.3 Problem Formulation
In this section, we aim to look for the optimal weight vector to maximize the
secrecy sum rate while maintaining the total transmit power below a given maxi-
mum value. The secrecy sum rate is expressed as follows:
RsumS =
1
2
log(1 +
P2w
HR12w
σ21 + σ
2
Rw
HR11w
)
+
1
2
log(1 +
P1w
HR12w
σ22 + σ
2
Rw
HR22w
)
−1
2
log det (I + EEHN−1e ).
(4.13)
Therefore, the optimization problem can be expressed as
max
w
RsumS (4.14a)
s.t P1 + P2 + w
HDw ≤ PT , (4.14b)
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where D is a diagonal positive definite matrix D = P1R11 + P2R22 + σ
2
RI, and PT
is the total available maximum power at relays and transceivers. It was in [10]
that Problem (4.14) can be written as:
max
w
wHC1w
wHC2w
.
wHC3w
wHC4w
.
wHC5w
wHC6w
, (4.15)
where
C1 = P2R12 + σ
2
RR11 + P
−1
r σ
2
1D,
C2 = σ
2
RR11 + σ
2
1P
−1
r D,
C3 = P1R12 + σ
2
RR22 + σ
2
2P
−1
r D,
C4 = σ
2
RR22 + σ
2
2P
−1
r D,
C5 = σ
2
e2σ
2
RRcc + σ
2
e2σ
2
e1P
−1
r D,
C6 = (P1P2|f2|2 + σ2e1P1)Rc1 + (P1P2|f1|2 + σ2e1P2)Rc2
+(P1σ
2
R|f2|2 + P2σ2R|f1|2 + σ2Rσ2e)Rcc + (P1σ2e2|f2|2+
P2σ
2
e2|f1|2 + σ2e1σ2e2)P−1r D
where Pr is the summation of the relays’ total transmit power, Rc1 = ac1a
H
c1,
Rc2 = ac2a
H
c2, Rcc = CC
H , and R22 = H2H
H
2 . We can obtain Pr = E{yHRyR} =
wHDw. Problem (4.15) is a product of triple RQs, that is generally considered
as a difficult problem. Here, we propose two suboptimal solutions for maximizing
the secrecy sum rate when the total power is constrained with a certain value.
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4.3.1 Null Space Beamforming
In this section, after we design the relays weight to be nulled at the eavesdropper,
we maximize the secrecy sum rate when the total power of relays and transceivers
are constrained with a predefined value. In other words, we design w to be
orthogonal with the vectors ac1, ac2 to guarantee that the rate of eavesdropper
coming from the second phase is zero. Let G be the equivalent channel matrix
G = [ac1 ac2], hence G
Hw = 0. According to this case, eavesdropper cannot
obtain any information from the second phase since the signal forwarded from
relays completely nulled out at the eavesdropper. Therefore, the eavesdropper
can receive only one version of transmitted signals coming from the first phase.
The rate of the eavesdropper can be expressed as:
Re = 0.5 log(1 + (P1|f1|2 + P2|f2|2)/σ2e1).
Thus, the secrecy sum rate can be written as:
RsumS =
1
2
log(1 +
P2w
HR12w
σ21 + σ
2
Rw
HR11w
)
+
1
2
log(1 +
P1w
HR12w
σ22 + σ
2
Rw
HR22w
)
−1
2
log(1 + (P1|f 21 |+ P2|f 22 |)/σ2e1).
(4.16)
We rewrite w as w = Zq where Z is the projection matrix into the null space
of G, and q can be any vector (1 × (N − 2)) The optimization problem can be
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reformulated as:
max
q,P1,P2
(1+
P1q
HZR12Zq
σ21+σ
2
R
qHZR22Zq
)(1+
P2q
HZR12Zq
σ22+σ
2
R
qHZR11Zq
)
(1+(P1|f1|2+P2|f2|2)/σ2e1) (4.17a)
s.t. qZHDZq ≤ PT − P1 − P2. (4.17b)
Problem (4.17) is not that easy to solve for both the optimal beamforming vector
and sources powers. Thus, we adopt an iterative algorithm that obtains q and
P1, P2 alternatively.
Optimizing the beamforming vector
In this subsection, we will obtain the optimal beamforming vector that eliminate
the information signal at eavesdropper when the powers of the sources are fixed.
In [11], it is proved that the constraint (4.17b) holds with equality at optimality.
Let Pr = PT − P1 − P2 and B = 1Pr ZHDZ. Therefore, qHBq = 1. Let’s denote
the unit norm complex vector qˉ such that B0.5q = qˉ, then qˉH qˉ = qHBq = 1.
Therefore, optimization problem (4.17) is equivalent to the following
max
q
qˉHCˉ1qˉ
qˉHCˉ2qˉ
.
qˉHCˉ3qˉ
qˉHCˉ4qˉ
(4.18a)
s.t ‖qˉ‖2 = 1, (4.18b)
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where
Cˉ1 =
σ21I
Pr
+ σ2RB
−0.5ZHR11ZB−0.5
+P2B
−0.5ZHR12ZB−0.5,
Cˉ2 = (1 + (P1|f1|2 + P2|f2|2)/σ2e1)
(
σ21I
Pr
+ σ2RB
−0.5ZHR11ZB−0.5),
Cˉ3 =
σ22I
Pr
+ σ2RB
−0.5ZHR22ZB−0.5
+P1B
−0.5ZHR12ZB−0.5,
Cˉ4 =
σ22I
Pr
+ σ2RB
−0.5ZHR22ZB−0.5.
Problem (4.18) is similar to the Problem (3.5) investigated in chapter 3. There-
fore, we solve Problem (4.18) by going with the same procedures used in solving
(3.5). Hence, Algorithm 3.3 can be used to provide the optimal solution of Prob-
lem (4.18).
Optimizing the transceivers power
In this part, we obtain the optimal sources power when the beamforming vector
is given. Problem (4.17) can be reformulated as follows:
max
P1,P2
(1 + P2y1)(1 + P1y2)
(1 + (P1|f1|2 + P2|f2|2)/σ2e1)
(4.19a)
s.t P1k1 + P2k2 ≥ PT − σ2RwHw, (4.19b)
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where y1 = 2
wHR12w
σ21+σ
2
Rw
HR11w
, y2 =
wHR12w
σ22+σ
2
Rw
HR22w
, k1 = 1 + w
HR11w and k2 = 1 +
wHR22w. It is shown earlier that at optimality the inequality in (4.19b) must
be satisfied with equality. Hence, we can substitute P2 =
PT−σ2RwHw−P1k1
k2
in the
objective function (4.19a) to have the optimization problem as follows:
max
P1
a0 + P1a1 + P
2
1 a2
b0 + P1b1
, (4.20)
where a0 = 1 +
y1PT
k2
− y1σ2qˉH qˉ
k2
, a1 = y1 − y1k1k2 +
y1y2PT
k2
− y1y2qˉH qˉ
k2
, a2 = y2 − y1k1k2 ,
b1 =
1
σ2
(|fe|2 − k1σ2k2 |ge|2), and b0 = 1 +
PT−σ2qˉH qˉ
k2
|ge|2.
Problem (4.20) was considered in [11] and it was solved using Newton’s algo-
rithm to obtain the optimal sources powers when the beamforming vector is given.
Therefore, we provide Algorithm 4.1 to obtain both the beamforming vector and
the sources power.
Algorithm 4.1 Finding the joint (P ∗1 , P
∗
2 ,w
∗)
1. Give P1 and P2 initial values.
2. Use Algorithm 3.3 to find the optimal null space beamforming vector w.
3. Use Newton algorithm to solve Problem (4.20) to obtain P1 and P2.
4. Repeat steps 2) and 3) until (P1, P2,w) converge.
It is easy to prove that Algorithm 4.1 is convergent since as the number of
iterations increases the objective function of Problem (4.17) will increase. In ad-
dition, the objective function is bounded above because of that the total available
power is bounded above. On the other hand, Algorithm 4.1 cannot guarantee the
joint global optimal solution because the original function (4.17) is not convex.
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Therefore, to guarantee a near global optimal solution, we should give the initial
values for P1 and P2 close to their global optimal solution. Authors of [10] pro-
vided the joint optimal solution but with ignoring the signal coming from the first
phase (i.e., the expression (1 + (P1|f1|2 + P2|f2|2)/σ2e1) has not been included in
the optimization problem). Accordingly, we can use the solution provided in [10]
as an initial values for P1 and P2 then implement Algorithm 4.1.
4.3.2 Suboptimal Solution: Ignoring one Rayleigh quo-
tient (IORQ)
In this section, we focus on optimizing the beamforming vector without consider-
ing the sources powers. The disadvantage of the null space beamforming approach
is that it is inefficient solution in case of the number of relays is small since the
weight vector has to be orthogonal with two vectors which means that the avail-
able dimensions to beamform the information signal for sources are only N − 2
dimensions. Besides, it is not applicable when N < 3. It is crucial to observe that
eliminating the information signal at the eavesdropper degrades the information
rate at the transceivers; i.e., there is a trade off between the transceivers infor-
mation rates and the information rate at the eavesdropper. On the other hand,
as the number of relays increases (goes to infinity), the optimal null space beam-
forming approach will approach the optimal solution of Problem (4.15). It can be
demonstrated that as the number of relays increases the information rates at the
transceivers will increase and the information rate at eavesdropper will go to zero
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which is equivalent to the optimal null space beamforming approach. Therefore,
In the following approach, we deal directly with the original problem (4.15) to
maximize the whole secrecy sum rate aiming to enhance the secrecy sum rate
especially when number of relays is small. We have C2,C3 and C5 are diagonal
matrices and are a partial of the other matrices which indicates that they have
less impact on the whole function than the other matrices. Thus, our approach
based on ignoring one Rayleigh quotient either w
HC5w
wHC2w
or w
HC5w
wHC4w
and solve the
rest of the function. Therefore, the problem can be written in two ways:
max
w
wHC1w
wHC2w
.
wHC3w
wHC6w
, (4.21a)
or
max
w
wHC1w
wHC4w
.
wHC3w
wHC6w
. (4.22a)
Algorithm 3.3 can be used to solve both Problems (4.21) and (4.22) and select
the solution vector that maximize the objective function in (4.15) more than the
other. But this way will double the complexity of the problem by implementing
Algorithm 3.3 twice. Instead, We propose another method to decide whether to
solve (4.21) or (4.22). It is known that the objective function in (4.15) is bounded
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by
wHC1w
wHC4w
.w
HC3w
wHC6w
λmin(C
−1
2 C5) ≤ w
HC1w
wHC2w
.w
HC3w
wHC4w
.w
HC5w
wHC6w
≤ w
HC1w
wHC4w
.
wHC3w
wHC6w
λmax(C
−1
2 C5)
(4.23)
It is clear that solving (4.22) provides the optimal solution if λmax(C
−1
2 C5) =
λmin(C
−1
2 C5) and it is near the optimal solution (or ²-optimal) if
λmax(C
−1
2 C5)
λmin(C
−1
2 C5)
≤
1 + ², where ² is small value. Similarly,
wHC1w
wHC2w
.w
HC3w
wHC6w
λmin(C
−1
4 C5) ≤ w
HC1w
wHC2w
.w
HC3w
wHC4w
.w
HC5w
wHC6w
≤ w
HC1w
wHC2w
.
wHC3w
wHC6w
λmax(C
−1
4 C5)
(4.24)
Consequently, we check that if
λmax(C
−1
2 C5)
λmin(C
−1
2 C5)
≤ λmax(C−14 C5)
λmin(C
−1
4 C5)
, we solve Problem
(4.22), otherwise we solve (4.21) since we do not have to solve eigenvalue problems
because the eigenvalues of the matrices C−14 C5 and C
−1
2 C5 are their diagonal val-
ues. It is important to say that solving the product of two Rayleigh quotients is the
first step to solve the product of three RQs and provide the optimal beamforming
vector.
4.4 Simulation Results
In this part of the chapter, the simulation results are presented to demonstrate the
effectiveness of the proposed physical layer security algorithms. In each simula-
tion result, we generate the channels randomly as independent complex Gaussian
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Figure 4.2: Comparison of the proposed Algorithm 3.3 and the exhaustive search
(Algorithm 3.1) for null space beamforming by plotting the secrecy sum rate
against the total available power with N=4, and N=8.
random variables with zero mean and unit variance. All SDP problems are solved
efficiently using interior point method provided by Matlab CVX toolbox [3]. We
obtain each result by averaging over 2000 Monte Carlo channel realization. In
Fig. 4.2 we show the comparison between the exhaustive search (Algorithm 3.1)
for u2 implemented in Problem (3.9) and the proposed algorithm 3 in terms of
secrecy sum rate against the total available maximum transmit power when N=4
and N=8. For different values of the total available power and different number
of relays, It is shown that the proposed Algorithm 3.3 provides the exact secrecy
sum rate as the exhaustive search grants which means that Algorithm 3.3 pro-
vides the optimal null space beamforming vector. Hence, Algorithm 3.3 can be
used to solve Problem (4.18) instead of Algorithm 3.1 to avoid the complexity of
implementing multiple SDP problems.
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Figure 4.3: Comparison of the proposed Algorithm 3.3 for null space beamforming
and the solution provided by reference [10] and [11] by plotting secrecy sum rate
against the total obtainable power with different number of relays.
In Fig. 4.3, our proposed solution (Algorithm 4.1) for null space beamforming
is compared to the approaches proposed in [10] and [11]. It is shown that the
security improves as the total available power increases. This is because of that
most of the increase in the total available power is devoted for the relays power
which increases the mutual information rates at transceivers while the information
rate at eavesdropper cannot improve anymore. It is also shown in Fig. 4.3 that as
the number of relays increases, the secrecy sum rate increases because of the array
gain that helps in increasing the information rates at the transceivers while keeping
the information rate at the eavesdropper nulled. It is shown that Algorithm 4.1
provides better performance regardless of the total available power and the number
of relays are. Authors of [10] did not provide a solution for the beamforming vector
when the sources powers are given, while authors in [11] provided a suboptimal
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Figure 4.4: Comparison of our solution for null space beamforming and the so-
lution provided by reference [11] by plotting secrecy sum rate against the total
available power at relays with various number of relays
solution for the product of two Rayleigh quotients maximizing problem. Therefore,
we compare the proposed Algorithm 3.3 that solves the product of two Rayleigh
quotients and the algorithm proposed in [11] in Fig 4.4 without optimizing the
sources powers. We assume that the sources powers P1 = P2 = 0.25PT for both
algorithms. It is also shown that our solution outperforms the solution provided
in [11] in all situations.
In Fig. 4.5, we demonstrate that Algorithm 3.3 grants the global optimal
solution for maximizing the product of two Rayleigh quotients when the beam-
forming vector is not designed to be nulled at the eavesdropper; i.e., we solved
our proposed approach IORQ using two algorithms: the exhaustive search and
Algorithm 3.3 and it is shown that they are identical.
As shown before that the null space beamforming is not efficient when there
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Figure 4.5: Comparison of our solution Algorithm 3.3 for the IORQ suboptimal
solution and the exhaustive search by plotting the secrecy sum rate against the
overall obtainable power at relays and sources with N=3, and N=6.
is a few relays. Therefore, in Fig. 4.6, we compare our proposed approach IORQ
with our optimal null space beamforming in terms of the secrecy sum rate against
the total available power. The comparison implemented when P1 = P2 = 0.25PT
for both approaches. Fig. 4.6 shows that the suboptimal approach IORQ provides
a substantial improvement in secrecy sum rate when N=3 and 4. In the optimal
null space beamforming, it is shown that when the number of relays is 3 and in low
power, the secrecy sum rate is negative which means that the information rate of
the eavesdropper coming from the first phase is greater than the the summation
of the information rates of the transceivers. This is due to the reason that two
dimensions are used to eliminate the eavesdropper’s information rate, and hence
the remaining one dimension is not enough to improve the information rates at
the sources. In contrast, as shown in Fig. 4.6, proposed IORQ guarantees non
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Figure 4.6: Comparison of our solution for null space beamforming and the pro-
posed suboptimal solution (ignoring one Rayleigh quotient) by plotting secrecy
sum rate against the total available power with N=3, and N=4.
zero secrecy sum rate even if the number of relays is 3 and ithe power is low.
Although the number of relays increases in Fig. 4.7, IORQ still provides
a significant improvement in secure communications over that of the proposed
optimal null space beamforming when N = 5 and N = 6. This shows that the
impact of the ignored Rayleigh quotient on the whole function (4.15) is not that
significant.
In Fig. 4.8, it is shown that the IORQ outperforms the null space beamforming
when the total available power is low. This is because of the fact that the null
space beamforming degrades the SNR at transceivers in order to null it at the
eavesdropper. However, when the available power at the relays is high, the SNR
at the transceivers will improve. In other words, increasing the power at the relays
will increase the information rates at transceivers while keeping the eavesdropper’s
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Figure 4.7: Comparison of our solution for null space beamforming and the pro-
posed suboptimal solution (ignoring one Rayleigh quotient) by plotting secrecy
sum rate against the total available power with N=5, and N=6.
rate nulled.
To show the relationship between the secrecy sum rate and the number of relays
for both approaches, Fig. 4.9, shows the secrecy sum rate versus N when the total
available power is 5 dBW, 10 dBW and 15 dBW . It is shown that as the number
of relays increases, the difference between the performance of IORQ and the null
space beamforming diminishes. This is because of the reason that the null space
beamforming approaches the optimal solution of Problem (4.15) as N increases. It
can also be realized from Fig. 8 that as N increases the enhancement of the secrecy
sum rate per one node goes down. This is because the amount increased due to the
array gain will decrease as the number of relays increases. Therefore, when N is
large, it is fair to choose two dimensions to eliminate the signal at the eavesdropper
and use the rest to maximize the information rates at the transceivers. It is also
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Figure 4.8: Comparison of our solution for null space beamforming and the pro-
posed suboptimal solution (ignoring one Rayleigh quotient) by plotting secrecy
sum rate against the total available power with N=7, and N=8.
shown that when the total available power is low, IORQ still outperforms the null
space beamforming until N = 10. On the other hand, in the high power cases
(e.g., P = 15dBW ), null space beamforming starts to perform better when N = 8
and larger. It is clear that even with high power transmission with a large number
of relays, optimal null space beamforming provides a very slight improvement in
secure communication better than IORQ, which means that IORQ is close to the
optimal solution of Problem (4.15).
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, the physical layer security in TWRS was studied in the existence
of multiple relays and an eavesdropper when each node only has a single antenna
and the global CSI is available. We provided two approaches to improve the secure
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Figure 4.9: Comparison of our solution for null space beamforming and the pro-
posed suboptimal solution (ignoring one Rayleigh quotient) by plotting secrecy
sum rate against the number of relays when the total available power is P=10
dBW.
communication rates which are the optimal null space beamforming and IORQ.
The optimal null space beamforming vector that has not been solved before was
provided. Then an iterative algorithm to enhance the secrecy sum rate by solving
the sources powers and beamforming vector problems alternatively was proposed.
Another novel suboptimal approach which is called IORQ was proposed. As shown
in the simulation results, This approach IORQ outperforms the optimal null space
beamforming in case of the number of relays is less than or equal to 8, while at
large number of relays, null space beamforming provides a slight improvement
over IORQ.
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CHAPTER 5
PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY
IN TWRS WHEN CSI IS
UNAVAILABLE
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we investigate the secure communication in TWRS proposed in
the Chapter 4 in case the CSI of the eavesdropper is unavailable. Based on the
fact that, in many applications, it is not easy to attain the eavesdropper channel,
and in some cases relays and transceivers cannot realize whether there is an eaves-
dropper or not. In this chapter, we focus on studying the physical layer security
under these assumptions. In the second phase, artificial noise is transmitted from
the relays to jam the eavesdropper. In other words, relays will work as a jam-
mers to the eavesdropper and a helpers to the legitimate sources. The available
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power at the relays is divided into two parts: one part is devoted to amplify and
forward the information signals and the rest of the power is devoted to generate
an artificial noise to jam the eavesdroppers. In order to reserve the maximum
power for jamming the eavesdropper, the optimization problem is formulated so
as to minimize the power of the information signal under Qos at both transceivers.
We show that the formulated problem is a non-convex QCQP problem, then it
can be converted into a SDP with two trace constraints which can be solved by
the interior point method. In order to avoid the complexity of the interior point
method, we reformulate the problem and propose a novel solution that provides
the optimal relays beamforming vector with a significantly lower complexity. We
show that in most cases, we can have a closed-form expression of the optimal solu-
tion. In addition, our proposed solution can be used for all QCQPs with positive
definite objective function and two constraints.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows; the model of the system is
introduced in Section 5.2. In Section 5.3, we present the achievable secrecy sum
rate, the problem formulation and proposed solution. Simulation results are given
in Section 5.4, and finally the chapter is concluded in Section 5.5.
5.2 System Model
We consider the same system model considered in Chapter 4 with same specifica-
tions and constraints except that the CSI of eavesdropper is unavailable.
Therefore, In the second phase, the available power at the relays is divided
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Figure 5.1: System model
into two parts: one part is devoted to amplify the information signal by a complex
vector w and the rest of the power is devoted for the artificial noise to jam the
eavesdroppers. As a result, we can write the transmitted signal at the relays as:
xR = WyR + na, (5.1)
where na is the jamming vector or the artificial noise that is designed to interfere
the eavesdropper. Vector na is assumed to be designed so that it does not affect
the authorized users; i.e., na must be chosen at the null space of the channel
vectors h1 and h2. In addition, it must be transmitted in all directions to cover
all the potential locations of eavesdroppers. The received signals at sources can
be expressed as:
yS1 =
√
P2w
Ha12x2 +
√
P1w
Ha11x1 + w
HH1nR + n
H
a h1 + nS1, (5.2)
yS2 =
√
P1w
Ha12x1 +
√
P2w
Ha22x2 + w
HH2nR + n
H
a h2 + nS2. (5.3)
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In order to eliminate the effect the artificial noise on the legitimate transceivers,
we should design the artificial noise such that nHa h1 = n
H
a h2 = 0.
√
P1w
Ha11x1
in equation (5.2) and
√
P2w
Ha22x2 in equation (5.3) are called the backward self-
interference, and can be eliminated if each transmitter knows its instantaneous
channel and the beamforming vector w. Therefore, equations (5.2) and (5.3) can
be written as:
yS1 =
√
P2w
Ha12x2 + w
HH1nR + nS1 , (5.4)
yS2 =
√
P1w
Ha12x1 + w
HH2nR + nS2 , (5.5)
while in the second phase, the eavesdropper can receive a noisy version which can
be written as:
y
(2)
E =
√
P2w
Hac2x2 +
√
P1w
Hac1x1 + w
HCnR + c
Hna + ne2. (5.6)
Since eavesdropper has two chances to get the information signal from the first
and second phase, it can use optimal ratio combining to maximize its SNR and
create an equivalent MIMO system. The received signal at the eavesdropper in a
vector form can be reformulated as:
yE = Zx + ne, (5.7)
where yE =
 y
(1)
E
y
(2)
E
 , Z =

√
P1f1
√
P2f2
√
P1w
Hac1
√
P2w
Hac2
 , ne =
100
 ne1
wHCnR + c
Hna + ne2
 and s = [ s1 s2 ].
The information rate at the transceivers are
RS1 =
1
2
log(1 +
P2w
HR12w
σ21 + σ
2
Rw
HR11w
), (5.8a)
RS2 =
1
2
log(1 +
P1w
HR12w
σ22 + σ
2
Rw
HR22w
), (5.8b)
The information rate at eavesdropper is RE =
1
2
log det (I + ZZHN−1e ), where Ne
is the covariance matrix of the received noise at eavesdropper which is:
Ne =
 σ2e1 0
0 σ2e2 + σ
2
Rw
HRccw + n
H
a Rccna
 . (5.9)
5.3 Problem Formulation
The optimization problem is formulated based on two criteria: 1) both transceivers
have acceptable QoS by assuring that the received SNRs must be greater than
a predefined thresholds; and 2) minimize the power devoted for the information
signal so that the remain power devoted for the artificial noise is maximized with
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a constraint on the relaying power. The optimization problem can be written as:
min
w
wH(P1R11 + P2R22 + σ
2
RIN )w (5.10a)
s.t
P2w
HR12w
σ21 + σ
2
Rw
HR11w
≥ γ1, (5.10b)
P1w
HR12w
σ22 + σ
2
Rw
HR22w
≥ γ2, (5.10c)
where γ1 and γ2 are predefined thresholds for the information signal to noise ratio
at S1 and S2, respectively. In general the problem can be expressed as
min
w
wH(P1R11 + P2R22 + σ
2
RIN)w (5.11a)
s.t wH(P1R12−σ2Rγ1R11)w ≥ σ21γ1 (5.11b)
wH(P1R12−σ2Rγ2R22)w ≥ σ22γ2 (5.11c)
Let G0 = (P1R11 + P2R22 + σ
2
RIN), G1 =
1
σ21γ1
(P1R12−σ2Rγ1R11) and G2 =
1
σ22γ2
(P1R12−σ2Rγ2R22), so we can write (5.11) as
min
w
wHG0w (5.12a)
s.t. wHG1w ≥ 1 (5.12b)
wHG2w ≥ 1, (5.12c)
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G0 can be shown to be a positive definite matrix, while G1 and G2 are indefinite
matrices. Problem (5.12) can be reformulated as a SDP with rank constraint as
min
W
tr(WG0) (5.13a)
s.t tr(WG1) ≥ 1 (5.13b)
tr(WG2) ≥ 1 (5.13c)
W º 0, Rank(W) = 1. (5.13d)
The constraint (5.13d) guarantees that the matrix W can be written as W =
wwH . Problem (5.13) is non-convex because the rank constraint of W. In [41],
and is shown in Chapter 1, it was shown that if the number of the trace constraints
is n, then the global optimal solution matrix W will have a rank r ≤ √n. Here,
in Problem (5.13), the number of trace constraints is two traces which means
that the solution matrix W will definitely have rank one. Therefore, the optimal
beamforming vector w is the eigenvector related to the maximum eigenvalue of
the optimal matrix W. Although, SDP can provide the optimal beamforming
vector, it suffers from high complexity, where SDP problems are usually solved
via interior point method. Authors in [11] show that the complexity of SDP
problem is O((N +M)7) where M is the number of the trace constraints and N is
the row or column dimension of G0 (number of relays). Hence, here we propose an
alternative solution for the SDP problem that provides the optimal beamforming
vector with significant decrease in complexity. First, it is direct to show that in
Problem (5.13), at least one inequality constraint will be achieved with equality
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at optimality. Otherwise, the norm of the beamforming vector can be scaled down
to achieve the constraint with equality, which cause a diminution in the objective
function.
Theorem 5.1 If one of the constraints in (5.13) holds with equality, the optimal
beamforming vector w∗ is either w1 = 1√
vH1 G1v1
v1 or w2 =
1√
vH2 G1v2
v2, where
v1 = vmax(G
−1
0 G1), v2 = vmax(G
−1
0 G2).
Proof. The problem in (5.13) is convex since both the objective function and
the constraints are convex. It can also be shown that the problem in (5.13)
satisfies Slater’s condition which states that strong duality holds if there exists
a feasible point at which the inequality constraints hold with strict inequalities
and the primal optimization problem is convex (details in [42]). Thus, the KKT
conditions are necessary and sufficient for a primal-dual point to be optimal. The
Lagrangian function of Problem (5.13) is
Γ = tr(WG0)− tr(WQ)− β0tr(WG1)− β1tr(WG2) + β0 + β1, (5.14)
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where β0 ≥ 0, β1 ≥ 0 and Q º 0 are the Lagrangian dual variables. The KKT
conditions are:
dΓ
dW
= G0 −Q∗ − β∗0G1 − β∗1G2 = 0 (5.15a)
tr(W∗G1)− 1 ≥ 0 (5.15b)
tr(W∗G2)− 1 ≥ 0 (5.15c)
tr(W∗Q) = 0 (5.15d)
β∗0tr(W
∗G1)− β∗0 = 0 (5.15e)
β∗1tr(W
∗G2)− β∗1 = 0 (5.15f)
W∗ º 0, Q∗ º 0 β∗0 ≥ 0 β∗1 ≥ 0. (5.15g)
From KKT conditions, the dual optimization problem can be written as
max
β0,β1
β0 + β1 (5.16a)
s.t. G0 − β0G1 − β1G2 º 0, (5.16b)
β0 ≥ 0, β1 ≥ 0. (5.16c)
Without loss of generality, assume that (5.13c) does not hold with equality which
means that β∗1 must be zero to satisfy (5.15f). Therefore, Problem (5.16) can be
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written as
max
β0,β1
β0 (5.17a)
s.t. G0 − β0G1 º 0, (5.17b)
β0 ≥ 0. (5.17c)
It can be shown that when tr(W∗G1) < tr(W∗G2), then (5.13b) holds with
equality while (5.13c) does not, and vice versa. Furthermore, at optimality both
the objective function of the primal and dual optimization problems are equal,
β∗0=tr(W
∗G0)=
tr(W∗G0)
tr(W∗G1)
=w
∗HG0w∗
w∗HG1w∗
. In addition, from the constraint (5.17b) we
have I º β∗0G−10 G1, and hence 1β∗0 I º G
−1
0 G1,which can be written as
1
β∗0
≥
λmax(G
−1
0 G1). This means that the maximum value of β
∗
0 is
1
λmax(G
−1
0 G1)
. Hence,
w∗HG1w∗
w∗HG0w∗
=
1
β∗0
= λmax(G
−1
0 G1). (5.18)
The optimal beamforming vector that satisfies (5.18) is vmax(G
−1
0 G1) =v1. But
we have to scale the solution vector to satisfy the constraints in problem (5.13).
Note that the scaling does not affect (5.18). Hence, we have w∗= 1√
vH1 G1v1
v1
aiming to have the constraint (5.13b) active while the (5.13c) strict. Similarly,
if (5.13c) holds with equality while (5.13b) does not, it can be shown that the
solution vector is w∗= 1√
vH2 G1v2
v2. Briefly, the optimal beamforming vector is w1
if (5.13b) holds with equality, whereas the solution vector is w2 if (5.13c) holds
with equality.
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Now, two questions should be raised here: 1) How would we determine which con-
straint will hold with equality? 2) What is the solution vector if both constraints
hold with equality?. To answer the first question we consider three cases:
• Case 1: If one of the solution vectors is feasible while the other is not, select
the feasible one.
• Case 2: If both of them are feasible, select the vector that minimizes the
objective function of Problem (5.13) more than the other.
• Case 3: If both of them are infeasible (which rarely occurs), it means that
at optimality both constraints hold with equality. This can be proved from
the dual problem (5.16). Both constraints hold with equality means that
β0 > 0 and β1 > 0, which means that neither w1 nor w2 can be a solution
for Problem (5.12).
In Cases 1 and 2, we have a closed-form solution to Problem (5.13). Despite the
rare occurrence of the third case, we propose another solution, other than the
SDP approach to avoid the complexity, which also provides the answer for the
second question. Here, we provide a solution for the problem in (5.13) in case of
both constraints hold with equality. Problem (5.13) can be written as
min
W
tr(WG0) (5.19a)
s.t tr(WG1) = 1 (5.19b)
tr(WG2) = 1 (5.19c)
W º 0, (5.19d)
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Problem (5.19) is similar to the Problem (2.17) that is solved in Chapter 2. There-
fore, the proposed Algorithm (2.1) can be used to provide the optimal solution of
Problem (5.19) efficiently.
Therefore, the algorithm to solve Problem (5.12) to obtain w∗ is
Algorithm 5.1 Finding the optimal solution of Problem (5.12).
1. find w1=
1√
vH1 G1v1
v1, and w2 =
1√
vH2 G2v2
v2.
2. If both w1 and w2 are feasible, select the vector that minimizes the objective
function of problem (5.13) more than the other.
3. If one of the solution vectors is feasible while the other is not, select the
feasible one
4. If both of them are infeasible (which rarely occurs) use Algorithm 2.1 to have
the optimal vector.
5.4 Simulation Results
Here, simulation results are introduced to demonstrate the effectiveness of the
proposed physical layer security algorithms. In each simulation result, we generate
each channel randomly as independent complex Gaussian random variables with
zero mean and unit variance. All SDP problems are solved efficiently using interior
point method provided by Matlab CVX toolbox [3]. We obtain the results by
averaging over 5000 Monte Carlo channel realization. In Fig. 5.2, it is obvious
that the secrecy sum rate increases with the maximum available power at the
relays until some point where the secrecy sum rate saturates; i.e., there is a limit
for the secrecy sum rate despite we have a boundless relays power. This is because
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Figure 5.2: Secrecy sum rate against the total available power at relays with
various number of relays, since γ1 = γ2 = 10dB and transceivers power P1 = P2 =
12dBW .
the required signal to noise ratios at transceivers (γ1 and γ2) are fixed, while the
information rate at the eavesdropper goes to zero with infinite artificial noise
power. It is also seen that increasing the number of relays improves the physical
layer security in the system. The results in Fig. 5.2 show that for different
number of relays and different total relays power levels, both SDP approach and
our proposed algorithm provide the same optimal solution vector and the same
secrecy sum rate.
In Fig. 5.3 we compare the computational complexity of SDP approach and
our approach in terms of the execution time. We plot the average percentage
ratio of execution time spent by the proposed solution with respect to the SDP
approach. It is shown that our algorithm provides substantially less computational
complexity than the SDP approach where, on average, it consums only 0.57% of
the time consumed by SDP.
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Figure 5.3: The average ratio of execution time spent by implementing our Al-
gorithm 5.1 with relative to SDP approach against maximum available power at
relays, N=4, N=8, N=12.
In Fig. 5.4, a special case of our problem is implemented where it is assumed
that the QoS in both transceivers must satisfy, with equality, the exact SNR. In
other words, we compare the SDP (5.19) to the proposed Algorithm 1. Similar
to Fig. 5.2, the results in Fig. 5.4 show that for different number of relays
and different total relays power levels, both the SDP approach and our proposed
algorithm provide the same optimal solution vector and the same secrecy sum
rate.
In Fig. 5.5, when both constraints must hold with equality, we compare the
computational complexity of the SDP approach and Algorithm 1 in terms of
the execution time. We plot the average ratio of execution time consumed by
the proposed solution with respect to the SDP approach. It is shown that our
algorithm provides substantially less complexity computational complexity than
the SDP approach where, on average, consumes about 1.13%, 2.15%, and 3.41%
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Figure 5.4: Comparison of SDP problem when both constraints hold with equality
and Algorithm 2.1, since γ1 = γ2 = 10dB and transceivers power P1 = P2 =
12dBW
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Figure 5.5: The average ratio of execution time spent by implementing our Al-
gorithm 1 with relative to SDP approach when both constraints satisfied with
equality versus maximum available power at relays with different number of re-
lays; N=4, N=8, N=12.
of the time consumed by SDP in case of 4, 8, and 12 relays, respectively.
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5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we considered a TWRS with one eavesdropper, where artificial
noise was used to maximize the secrecy rate. In order to maximize the artificial
noise power, we studied the problem of minimizing the information signal power.
An efficient algorithm to minimize the power was proposed where, in most cases
a closed-form expression of the optimal solution is provided. It was shown that
the proposed algorithm provides the same optimal solution that can be achieved
using SDP, but with dramatically reduced computational complexity.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE
WORK
In this chapter, the contribution of this thesis is summarized including the contri-
bution of the physical layer security in OWRS, and in TWRS with and without
CSI. Furthermore, some interesting topics in the scope of physical layer security
in relay networks are suggested as future research.
6.1 Summary of contributions
Here, we conclude the contribution of this thesis. The physical layer security in
OWRS was studied in two chapters. In Chapter 2, the power of relays minimiza-
tion under secrecy rate constraint was formulated. It was shown that the problem
is a nonconvex QCQP problem where it is not easy to solve it. A novel solution
was proposed to solve the QCQP problem which guarantee the optimal solution
with substantial low complexity. It was also proved that, in the relaying power
113
minimization problem under QoS constraints, the optimal value of the source
power is its maximum available power.
Then, maximizing the product of two RQs problem was solved. This problem
has been considered in the previous work as a difficult problem where suboptimal
solutions have been proposed. Therefore, an efficient algorithm was provided that
guarantee the optimal solution of maximizing the product of two RQs aiming to:
1. Maximize the secrecy rate in OWRS as illustrated in Chapter 3.
2. Maximize the secrecy sum rate in TWRC when the null space beamforming
is applied as shown in Chapter 4.
3. Find a suboptimal solution for the secrecy sum rate maximization in TWRS
which provided a remarkable improvement in secrecy sum rate as shown in
the simulation results of Chapter 4.
This problem of optimizing the product of the two RQs was first converted from
N-dimensional search to one dimensional search where a SDP has to be solved
in each iteration. Then the problem was significantly simplified by converting it
from a series of SDPs to a series of a generalized eigenvalue problems. Finally, an
efficient algorithm was proposed to find the optimal beamforming vector.
Additionally, in Chapter 4, it was shown in TWRS that eliminating the
full information for the eavesdropper may degrade the information rates at the
transceivers especially in case of having a small number of relay nodes and low
power, whereas we can allow some of the information signal to be received by
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the eavesdropper as long as it is at noise level and exploit that in enhancing the
SNR at the transceivers. We provided an efficient solution for how to exploit the
allowed eavesdropper information rate to enhance the information rates at the
transceivers. This was shown by simulation results where a significant improve-
ment in secrecy sum rate has been achieved.
Furthermore, a novel approach to solve the QCQP with two constraints and posi-
tive definite matrix at the objective function was proposed. As shown in Chapter
2 and Chapter 5, this approach has significantly decreased the complexity of solv-
ing the QCQP problems compared to SDP approach. This approach can also be
applied to tackle many problems that we are intending to consider as a future
work.
6.2 Future work
Although we provided an efficient algorithm to solve QCQP problems, it is re-
quired to extend the proposed algorithm to tackle the QCQPs when the trace
constraints are more than two traces. This will grant us the capability to utilize
the proposed algorithms in solving several problems in this area such as:
1. Minimizing the total power under individual information rate constraints in
TWRS at the transceivers and the eavesdropper.
2. Maximizing the SNR of the destination in OWRS with the existence of mul-
tiple eavesdroppers. In other words, maximize the SNR of the destination
under a constraints on the SNR of the eavesdroppers.
115
In TWRS, although we provide the optimal null space beamforming that prevents
the eavesdropper to receive a version of the transmitted signal through the second
phase, the eavesdropper still has a chance to receive a version during the first
phase. This is encouraging to study the selection of some relays to work as a
jammers in order to confuse the eavesdropper in both phases. This problem will
be formulated to find the optimal number of jammers and the optimal power of
jamming signal.
It is also recommended to study the physical layer security in a hybrid relaying
system. This system is a mixed of TWRS and OWRS which has not been proposed
before, where it can be built by adding one legitimate destination to the TWRS.
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